Posted on June 23rd, 2015 No comments
The British Government do not have an energy policy. They may think they have one, and they may regularly tell us that they have one, but in reality, they don’t. There are a number of elements of regulatory work and market intervention that they are engaged with, but none of these by itself is significant enough to count as a policy for energy. Moreover, all of these elements taken together do not add up to energy security, energy efficiency, decarbonisation and affordable energy.
What it takes to have an energy policy is a clear understanding of what is a realistic strategy for reinvestment in energy after the dry years of privatisation, and a focus on energy efficiency, and getting sufficient low carbon energy built to meet the Carbon Budget on time. Current British Government ambitions on energy are not realistic, will not attract sufficient investment, will not promote increased energy efficiency and will not achieve the right scale and speed of decarbonisation.
I’m going to break down my critique into a series of small chunks. The first one is a quick look at the numbers and outcomes arising from the British Government’s obsessive promotion of nuclear power, a fantasy science fiction that is out of reach, not least because the industry is dog-tired and motheaten.Academic Freedom, Alchemical, Artistic Licence, Assets not Liabilities, Bait & Switch, Baseload is History, Big Number, Big Picture, British Biogas, Burning Money, Carbon Recycling, Change Management, Cost Effective, Dead End, Design Matters, Direction of Travel, Disturbing Trends, Dreamworld Economics, Efficiency is King, Electrificandum, Emissions Impossible, Energy Autonomy, Energy Calculation, Energy Change, Energy Insecurity, Energy Revival, Engineering Marvel, Gamechanger, Gas Storage, Green Gas, Green Investment, Green Power, Growth Paradigm, Hydrocarbon Hegemony, Hydrogen Economy, Nuclear Nuisance, Nuclear Shambles, Optimistic Generation, Policy Warfare, Political Nightmare, Price Control, Realistic Models, Renewable Gas, Solar Sunrise, Solution City, Technofix, Technological Fallacy, Technological Sideshow, The Data, The Power of Intention, The Right Chemistry, The War on Error, Wasted Resource, Wind of Fortune, Zero Net
Posted on June 15th, 2015 No comments
I went to a fascinating meeting on Monday 8th June 2015, hosted by PricewaterhouseCooper (PwC) in London, and organised by the Solar Trade Association, and starring Mr Sunshine himself, Greg Barker, who was on top form, and exceptionally good value, as always.
We had very interesting presentations from a number of key actors in solar photovoltaic energy, including the newly rebranded Solar Power Europe. James Watson, Solar Power Europe‘s CEO, expressed a view to the effect that it could seem like a waste of time, effort and money for Europe to be spending half its Energy Union budget on reforming the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, when so much could be achieved instead through a recasting of the Renewable Energy Directive. Amendments are due in a new Renewable Energy package in 2017, as confirmed by Commissioner Arias Cañete in March 2015. These amendments would usefully tackle the risk of the European Capacity Mechanism being used to support coal-fired power in Germany – as the parallel policy has been in the UK.
The Energy Union is taking forward the open and free market principles of “harmonisation” of the electricity and gas trade in the geographical envelope of the Eurozone, which includes countries that have not taken the Euro currency, such as the UK, and countries that are in the European Economic Area but are not full members of the European Union, principally Norway. A key part of the Energy Union is a physical enactment of guarantees for market access – focusing on standards in gas and power products, and the interconnectors that make cross-border trade possible. It is in the interests of all the private energy companies, public energy companies, invididual producers and network operators in the region to take part in this project, as the outcomes will include not only free, open and fair trade, they will also increase energy security in the region, particularly as the level of renewable energy production increases. Renewable electricity is intermittent and variable at all time slices, and strongly seasonal and weather-related, and so international trade within the European region is essential.
Most commentators on the Energy Union narrow in on the electricity grids, but union also includes the gas grids. The legal framework for gas market harmonisation includes work on gas quality standards and also what kinds of gas can be transmitted through the pipelines, issues covered in the 2009 Energy Package, which permitted unconstrained access for alternative gases as long as they meet the gas protocols. This would permit gas grid injection of biomethane, and potentially other biogases or Renewable Gas varieties.
One of the main contributors to new power production in the Eurozone is renewable electricity, with growth that has continued throughout the recession in the economy. Although barriers to increased renewable power in the electricity grids have been by and large vaulted, through a combination of regulatory progress and subsidies, as the landscape has changed, so has the need for re-assessment of policy. For example, in the UK, the solar Feed-in Tariff has been strongly criticised as costing too much (although it is a minnow in terms of the total socialised energy budget), and has had to be “degressed” – or stepped down in stages. In Germany, all electricity consumers have been taxed in order to pay for the renewable energy budget – and there has even been a tax on “self-consumption” for solar power producers – and this has been strongly contested. Plans to manufacture low carbon gas from excess solar and wind power would be badly affected by this. It does seem strange that producer-consumers of virtually cost-less and zero carbon power should be taxed, especially when centralised producers are forced to sell power for virtually nothing when there is oversupply – for example on a sunny day.
What is more likely to hold back European solar expansion, according to Solar Power Europe, is the Minimum Import Price, or MIP. Solar Power Europe will are lobbying for an end to both the MIP and German solar tax. The MIP, according to their analysis, is making solar power in Europe too costly, compared to other regions. Roughly 60% to 70% of the MIP subsidy is going to support Chinese manufacturers, yet China’s solar power industry is becoming very successful in its own right, and doesn’t need this support. Solar Power Europe are concerned that there is gaming of the market going on to decrease the costs of solar panels in Europe – for example, panels made in China are being routed through countries where exports don’t come under the MIP rules. In effect, Solar Power Europe wants policy to change to stop subsidising China and iron out counter-productive internal policies.
Solar Power Europe have published their “Global Market Outlook : 2015 – 2019” this week, and clearly, there are sunny times ahead, especially since Greg Barker has a key role in delivering solar power in London.
Greg Barker came to the podium to give his summary of solar power in the UK. He reminded the solar power industry, that although they were becoming a serious sector, that they would continue to remain dependent on subsidies. He said that the major reduction in unit costs was probably over; and barring some improvements in underlying technology, such as revolutions in semiconductor devices, I think I’d probably agree with him. Greg Barker said that to promote the market, there was still a need to sweep away unintended obstacles – he said he didn’t understand why solar power was still cheaper in Germany. He said that the development in solar power was incredible – he said that when he had first taken office in the previous Coalition Government, when he had talked about his ambition for solar power, officials had “fallen off their chairs, laughing”, at his parrotting as Minister, but that now there was a risk of over-development under the Levy Control Framework – the policy that caps subsidy spending on energy. Greg Barker said that he regretted that the EMR bids from solar power (bidding into the Contracts for Difference auction instituted as part of the Electricity Market Reform) may now not get built. He said that the solar industry would be “gutted that Eric Pickles has gone”, and that with the new majority Conservative Government rooftop solar would get support from the Department for Communities and Local Government from their new Minister Greg Clark. Greg Barker said that Camilla Cavendish, appointed in David Cameron’s Policy Unit, is a real ally of renewable energy. Greg Barker warned the room that there would be no additions to the levy budget for solar power, and told the solar industry not to go asking for increases as the regulatory environment would be harsh. He said the solar power developers should aim to drive down their costs and dive into a far more centralised market. He said that he expected that there would be “insurgent companies” making significant progress on solar power – something that the Big Six electricity providers would be unable to do. He warned the solar industry to he “hardheaded and realistic” and urged them to work with the Government.
Greg Barker told us about his new appointment to the London Sustainable Development Commission. He said that when Boris Johnson had called him about this, he hadn’t heard of it. Greg Barker said that the population of London is growing by 100,000 a year, and that London has growing technology companies – so much so that clean tech in London is better than California. He said that he accepted the appointment to the London SDC on the basis that he would get carte blanche to reform it, to “shift the dial”. He said that “much as I love city farms, and bees“, that he wanted to create more focus. He said that he wanted to get the London SDC working to three criteria on solar power, firstly scalability. He wants to see solar power initiatives that are scalable – which I took to mean not just large unrepeatable projects, or small bespoke projects. Greg Barker said that solar power policy should have genuine additionality – not just producing more reports. The third criteria he wants to apply is that of replicability – as until now, the record of solar power in London was not very good. He said we should remember the aesthetics of solar power, and that big blue panels sitting proud of a red clay roof was not particularly appealing. He mentioned Amber Rudd, who has been given the post of Secretary of State for the Department of Energy and Climate Change, and how she has been talking about the aesthetics of nuclear power. He said this issue was not ephemeral and that it was important to have good design for the London “semi” – semi-detached house. He said that local policy changes could help – such as eliminating the Congestion Charge for solar power companies having to drive and park in London for installations. Greg Barker said that Ed Davey, the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change in the previous Government, was too narrow in his views on organisations that should be enabled to do solar projects. Greg Barker said that we needed not only co-operatives, but also charities, and local authority level alliances, to be enabled to do solar projects. He said that policy needed to be revisited as regards the mid-sector rooftop solar band. He said that if the solar industry and builders get together and propose a change in regulation, Greg Clark would listen. Greg Barker said that Government should be regulating for outcome and not process in order to make progress. Greg Barker said that he wanted solar power to be a key policy issue in the upcoming mayoral election (for the Mayor of London). He said that when he had sat down with Boris Johnson the issues that had surfaced were a need for policy to deal with the circular economy, and how to develop London’s clean tech cluster, and the need for a solar group.
Greg Barker finished with some good advice. He told the solar power industry to be “persuasive rather than loud”. He said that the solar industry need to understand that a good deal of subsidy has to be focused on the offshore wind power priority, and that this cannot be changed. He said that the solar power industry could “pick up the slack from onshore wind”. He reminded the solar industry to focus on aesthetics and to sell this along with the idea of energy efficiency and return on investment. He said that the Green Deal has shown that we are still a long way from a market in energy efficiency. He asked if the Feed-in Tariff would survive, as solar power continues in its march towards grid parity.
Later on in the day, over snacks and a couple of beers, I was shown worrying-looking maps of the state of the National Grid by somebody looking at the “constraints” being imposed by Western Power Distribution (WPD), for example, in the South West of England. A summary that could be drawn from the maps was that there are difficulties with adding new power generators into large parts of the grid network. For the proposed Hinkley Point C nuclear power plant and the new Seabank 3 gas-fired power plant, an entirely new piece of grid will be needed – which will increase the lead time to these projects being able to contribute power to the network. If modifications for major projects are going to take up all the attention of National Grid, they won’t be able to advance the upgrades to the grid needed for small, decentralised projects – perhaps for years – and this is worrying as it imposes limitations on the amount of new renewable electricity that can be added in the near future. Some will see this as excellent news, as it will cap the rollout of windfarms and solar parks. However, this will create a drag on low carbon transition. It seems that large amounts of new renewables will only be possible in localised grids – so emphasis on developing solar power in London is useful.
Posted on June 9th, 2015 No comments
The three pillars of future energy systems will be : efficiency, renewable electricity and energy storage. Efficiency in energy systems will be strongly dependent on balancing supply and demand, not only moment by moment, but also intra-day and intra-week – coping with peaks and troughs. With increasing amounts of renewable electricity generation, balancing becomes ever more important, even down to the hour-by-hour scale. In addition, besides fine grain issues, there will be climate and weather variations in demand for energy, and also seasonal variation. At the present time, there is a significant disparity between summer and winter gas demand for many developed, industrialised countries. This divergence between seasons is not so pronounced in power demand, unless there is strong demand for electrical heating in winter. That power demand does not have as wide a seasonal swing as that for Natural Gas is a good thing – as it means that nations do not need to build electricity generation plant that remains idle for most of the year. With the anticipated exit from coal-fired power generation, countries are likely to want to turn to gas-fired power plants, which will increase gas demand year-round, but will not reduce the inter-seasonal demand disparity.
Energy system efficiency being dependent on balancing services where there are high levels of renewable power generation in the grid networks means that there will be a growing need for inter-seasonal energy storage. There is likely to be an excess of renewable electricity generation in summer, as is already being seen in Germany. Solid state energy storage, such as large scale batteries – whether chemical, thermal or potential energy – are likely to remain suitable for short cycle load balancing, but may not be able to stretch to time periods longer than a few weeks. Other options for energy storage are in development, but Germany and other countries have already decided to go for low carbon gas to store summer solar and other renewable power excess. Germany’s dena agency plans gas grid injection of a low volume of “Power to Gas” Renewable Hydrogen and a higher volume of synthetic methane. It is important to note that the scale of production possible for low carbon industrially manufactured gas is an order of magnitude greater than for biogas (made from biomass by microbiological processing).
Work to strengthen energy security will help with choosing manufactured gas for energy balancing between seasons. The UK and other countries are improving and increasing Natural Gas storage facilities, and work to manufacture methane-rich gas can make use of this provision. A shift towards low carbon manufactured gas over the next few decades will help meet tightening carbon budgets, as the use of Natural Gas will become subject to constraint, because Carbon Capture and Storage will not be developed rapidly.
The total amount of gas demand is likely to remain high. Despite the fact that over the next few decades, increasing building insulation rates will strongly reduce strong winter demand for gas, gas is going to be increasingly used in mobility solutions – for example compressed gas inter-city heavy good vehicles, shipping and trains. This will make gas demand more uniform throughout the year, so inter-seasonal gas storage will not be so vital. However, there will still be cold, wind-less, dark winter days when gas will be important, even if it’s only for power generation.
To make Renewable Gas viable in the short-term, it is vital to have as much solar power and wind power as possible, to put into “Power to Gas” systems. As time goes by, new methods to make Renewable Hydrogen will emerge, complementing the electrolysis used for today’s Renewable Hydrogen production. Interestingly enough, these advances could come from within the petrorefinery sector, where there is growing demand for hydrogen for clean refinery processing. It makes no sense to compete with other gas users by making all this new hydrogen from Natural Gas – sooner or later Shell and BP will turn to making Renewable Hydrogen in large volumes.
Low carbon manufactured gas – both Renewable Hydrogen and synthetic methane – can help the oil and gas companies survive, if they follow a strategy to first of all transition out of crude petroleum oil to Natural Gas, and then transition to Renewable Gas. The use of Natural Gas will decline, and the use of low carbon gas will increase, reducing the risk of economic discontinuity from the collapse of “big oil and gas”.
Posted on June 4th, 2015 No comments
It may not be immediately obvious that significant change is underway in the energy sector. Heavily-capitalised and strongly-invested petroleum oil and gas companies stride the lands and seas, seeking what still fruitful part of the Earth’s lithosphere they may devour. Billions of overweight road and air vehicles incessantly burr and rattle, draining the carbon lifeblood from geological time. Yet, still, change is a-coming in.
You wouldn’t know it from the public discourse on energy futures that the debate has shifted anywhere away from the 1980s or the 1990s. Major oil and gas companies still tout the benefits of pricing negative emissions, as if ordinary people still believe what economists and financiers claim. Shell and BP still sell the merits of Carbon Capture and Storage, not that there’s much of this, nor will there be, principally because the technologies proposed are sub-sectoral, will cost a lot to deploy, and won’t capture all the carbon dioxide, anyway. The Laws of Thermodynamics mitigate against the effectiveness of Carbon Capture and Storage – in some cases it could take more energy to bury carbon than dig it up in the first place, and that’s not going to be a winner. But, even though the hydrocarbon hegemony hasn’t brought its arguments up-to-the-minute, change is still taking place.
There are maybe twenty good years to effect a transition out of fossil fuels into manufactured low carbon fuels. The reasons why this needs to happen are : climate change, air quality, Peak Sweet and Peak Easy. Climate change, caused by global warming, caused principally by the burning of fossil fuels and the release of carbon dioxide emissions to the atmosphere. Air quality is an issue of liveability, as the world’s population clusters ever more into urban environments, cities cannot support coal-burning for power, nor diesel-burning for transport. Peak Sweet is the geological fact : the major pools of hydrocarbons light in sulphur compounds are being depleted so rapidly, that it might come about that the only economic resources left to exploit are sour – with both high levels of sulphur and carbon dioxide. Peak Easy is also a geological fact : remaining hydrocarbon resources that are economic to mine, drill and pump are depleting, and so fossil fuel production is going to get increasingly complex and risky. The oil spills and accidental gas venting of the past could be dwarfed by spills and accidental venting of the future.
Of this list, Peak Sweet and Peak Easy are the reasons why the oil and gas industry will change, even though the position of Civil Society still rests in the territory of climate change and air quality. How to get these positions to marry, to build a unifying narrative ?
Let me propose Shell and BP a public relations pitch for free, no consultancy fees : big up your plans for the low carbon transition – tell the people that you are going to stop digging up climate-destroying carbon for a living, and you are going to focus on manufacturing low carbon gases and oils. I mean, Shell and BP are going to need to do this anyway if they want to stay in business – Peak Sweet and Peak Easy could finish off their rates of return – so why don’t they communicate the positive benefits of the low carbon transition and win friends and investors everywhere ?
What would I write if I wrote them a letter ? “Dear Shell and BP, stop alienating people with tired and failed narratives about carbon pricing and Carbon Capture and Storage. You know these strategies will fail to address the core problems of climate change and air quality. But you also know that these strategies will fail to address Peak Sweet and Peak Easy. It’s time to come clean and publish your strategies for decarbonising your energy products. No, it’s not your natural inclination to go massive on wind power or solar power, so why not go with Renewable Gas – Renewable Methane and Renewable Hydrogen ? This is within your core chemistry capabilities, and ramping up Renewable Gas will prevent you losing market share to third parties like Siemens, GE, Alstom and Schlumberger as they develop Renewable Gas options. You want to remain in business, don’t you ? All of your shareholders count on you. And they won’t accept living with the risk of a massive carbon bubble forever. You have maybe twenty years to prove you can really change, stop digging up ancient climate-disturbing carbon, and transition to low carbon energy products. If you use all your public relations skill, you could sell this transition as a truly valuable change (which it is), and keep friends and influence. The next generation could still respect you if you go public with your need to decarbonise. Shell and BP, save yourselves ! Yours sincerely, etc”
The thing is, Shell and BP can transition to low carbon energy gases and fuels. They can, and they will – they just need to crack on with it faster if they want to survive climate change, disinvestment, divestment and Peak Oil. The world will reinvest in energy : Shell and BP need to get on board the low carbon train or be left to shrink and sink.
Posted on June 3rd, 2015 No comments
Shell, BP and some of their confederates in the European oil and gas industry have inched, or perhaps “centimetred”, forward in their narrative on climate change. Previously, the major oil and gas companies were regularly outed as deniers of climate change science; either because of their own public statements, or because of secretive support of organisations active in denying climate change science. It does seem, finally, that Shell in particular has decided to drop this counter-productive “playing of both sides”. Not that there are any “sides” to climate change science. The science on climate change is unequivocal : changes are taking place across the world, and recent global warming is unprecedented, and has almost definitely been attributed to the burning of fossil fuels and land use change.
So Shell and BP have finally realised that they need to shed the mantle of subtle or not-so-subtle denial, although they cling to the shreds of dispute when they utter doubts about the actual numbers or impacts of global warming (for example : http://www.joabbess.com/2015/06/01/shells-public-relations-offensive/). However, we have to grant them a little leeway on that, because although petrogeologists need to understand the science of global warming in order to know where to prospect for oil and gas, their corporate superiors in the organisation may not be scientists at all, and have no understanding of the global carbon cycle and why it’s so disruptive to dig up all that oil and gas hydrocarbon and burn it into the sky. So we should cut the CEOs of Shell and BP a little slack on where they plump for in the spectrum of climate change narrative – from “utter outright doom” to “trifling perturbation”. The central point is that they have stopped denying climate change. In fact, they’re being open that climate change is happening. It’s a miracle ! They have seen the light !
But not that much light, though. Shell and BP’s former position of “scepticism” of the gravity and actuality of global warming and climate change was deployed to great effect in delaying any major change in their business strategies. Obviously, it would have been unseemly to attempt to transmogrify into renewable energy businesses, which is why anybody in the executive branches who showed signs of becoming pro-green has been shunted. There are a number of fairly decent scalps on the fortress pikes, much to their shame. Shell and BP have a continuing duty to their shareholders – to make a profit from selling dirt – and this has shelved any intention to transition to lower carbon energy producers. Granted, both Shell and BP have attempted to reform their internal businesses by applying an actual or virtual price on carbon dioxide emissions, and in some aspects have cleaned up and tidied up their mining and chemical processing. The worsening chemistry of the cheaper fossil fuel resources they have started to use has had implications on their own internal emissions control, but you have to give them credit for trying to do better than they used to do. However, despite their internal adjustments, their external-facing position of denial of the seriousness of climate change has supported them in delaying major change.
With these recent public admissions of accepting climate change as a fact (although CEOs without appropriate science degrees irritatingly disagree with some of the numbers on global warming), it seems possible that Shell and BP have moved from an outright “delay and deny” position, which is to be applauded.
However, they might have moved from “delay and deny” to “delay and distract”. Since the commencement of the global climate talks, from about the 1980s, Shell and BP have said the equivalent of “if the world is serious about acting on global warming (if global warming exists, and global warming is caused by fossil fuels), then the world should agree policy for a framework, and then we will work within that framework.” This is in effect nothing more than the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has put forward, so nobody has noticed that Shell and BP are avoiding taking any action themselves here, by making action somebody else’s responsibility.
Shell and BP have known that it would take some considerable time to get unanimity between governments on the reality and severity of climate change. Shell and BP knew that it would take even longer to set up a market in carbon, or a system of carbon dioxide emissions taxation. Shell and BP knew right from the outset that if they kept pushing the ball back to the United Nations, nothing would transpire. The proof of the success of this strategy was the Copenhagen conference in 2009. The next proof of the durability of this delaying tactic will be the outcomes of the Paris 2015 conference. The most that can come out of Paris is another set of slightly improved targets from governments, but no mechanism for translating these into real change.
Shell and BP and the other oil and gas companies have pushed the argument towards a price on carbon, and a market in carbon, and expensive Carbon Capture and Storage technologies. Not that a price on carbon is likely to be anywhere near high enough to pay for Carbon Capture and Storage. But anyway, the point is that these are all distractions. What really needs to happen is that Shell and BP and the rest need to change their products from high carbon to low carbon. They’ve delayed long enough. Now is the time for the United Nations to demand that the fossil fuel companies change their products.
This demand is not just about protecting the survival of the human race, or indeed, the whole biome. Everybody is basically on the same page on this : the Earth should remain liveable-inable. This demand for change is about the survival of Shell and BP as energy companies. They have already started to talk about moving their businesses away from oil to gas. There are high profile companies developing gas-powered cars, trains, ships and possibly even planes. But this will only be a first step. Natural Gas needs to be a bridge to a fully zero carbon world. The oil and gas companies need to transition from oil to gas, and then they need to transition to low carbon gas.
Renewable Gas is not merely “vapourware” – the techniques and technologies for making low carbon gas are available, and have been for decades, or in some cases, centuries. Shell and BP know they can manufacture gas instead of digging it up. They know they can do the chemistry because they already have to do much of the same chemistry in processing fossil hydrocarbons now to meet environmental and performance criteria. BP has known since the 1970s or before that it can recycle carbon in energy systems. Shell is currently producing hydrogen from biomass, and they could do more. A price on carbon is not going to make this transition to low carbon gas. While Shell and BP are delaying the low carbon transition by placing focus on the price of carbon, they could lose a lot of shareholders who shy away from the “carbon bubble” risk of hydrocarbon investment. Shell and BP need to decide for themselves that they want to survive as energy companies, and go public with their plans to transition to low carbon gas, instead of continuing to distract attention away from themselves.Academic Freedom, Alchemical, Assets not Liabilities, Bad Science, Bait & Switch, Be Prepared, Behaviour Changeling, Big Number, Big Picture, Carbon Capture, Carbon Commodities, Carbon Pricing, Carbon Recycling, Carbon Taxatious, Change Management, Climate Change, Conflict of Interest, Corporate Pressure, Cost Effective, Deal Breakers, Delay and Deny, Delay and Distract, Divest and Survive, Divide & Rule, Emissions Impossible, Energy Change, Energy Denial, Energy Insecurity, Energy Revival, Engineering Marvel, Extreme Energy, Extreme Weather, Fair Balance, Fossilised Fuels, Freak Science, Freemarketeering, Gamechanger, Geogingerneering, Global Warming, Green Gas, Green Investment, Green Power, Hydrocarbon Hegemony, Hydrogen Economy, Low Carbon Life, Major Shift, Marvellous Wonderful, Mass Propaganda, Modern Myths, Orwells, Paradigm Shapeshifter, Peak Emissions, Pet Peeves, Petrolheads, Policy Warfare, Political Nightmare, Price Control, Protest & Survive, Public Relations, Regulatory Ultimatum, Renewable Gas, Renewable Resource, Social Capital, Solution City, Stirring Stuff, The Myth of Innovation, The Power of Intention, The Right Chemistry, The Science of Communitagion, Wasted Resource, Western Hedge, Zero Net
Posted on June 2nd, 2015 No comments
So, some people do not understand why I am opposed to the proposal for a price on carbon put forward by Royal Dutch Shell and their oil and gas company confederates.
Those who have been following developments in climate change policy and the energy sector know that the oil and gas companies have been proposing a price on carbon for decades; and yet little has been achieved in cutting carbon dioxide emissions, even though carbon markets and taxes have been instituted in several regions.
Supporters of pricing carbon dioxide emissions urge the “give it time” approach, believing that continuing down the road of tweaking the price of energy in the global economy will cause a significant change in the types of resources being extracted.
My view is that economic policy and the strengthening of carbon markets and cross-border carbon taxes cannot provide a framework for timely and major shifts in the carbon intensity of energy resources, and here’s a brief analysis of why.
1. A price on carbon shifts the locus of action on to the energy consumer and investor
A price on carbon could be expected to alter the profitability of certain fossil fuel mining, drilling and processing operations. For example, the carbon dioxide emissions of a “tank of gas” from a well-to-wheel or mine-to-wheel perspective, could be made to show up in the price on the fuel station forecourt pump. Leaving aside the question of how the carbon tax or unit price would be applied and redistributed for the moment, a price on carbon dioxide emissions could result in fuel A being more expensive than fuel B at the point of sale. Fuel A could expect to fall in popularity, and its sales could falter, and this could filter its effect back up the chain of production, and have implications on the capital expenditure on the production of Fuel A, and the confidence of the investors in investing in Fuel A, and so the oil and gas company would pull out of Fuel A.
However, the business decisions of the oil and gas company are assumed to be dependent on the consumer and the investor. By bowing to the might god of unit price, Shell and its confederates are essentially arguing that they will act only when the energy consumers and energy investors act. There are problems with this declaration of “we only do what we are told by the market” position. What if the unit price of Fuel A is only marginally affected by the price on carbon ? What if Fuel A is regarded as a superior product because of its premium price or other marketing factors ? This situation actually exists – the sales of petroleum oil-based gasoline and diesel are very healthy, despite the fact that running a car on Natural Gas, biogas or electricity could be far cheaper. Apart from the fact that so many motor cars in the global fleet have liquid fuel-oriented engines, what else is keeping people purchasing oil-based fuels when they are frequently more costly than the alternative options ?
And what about investment ? Fuel A might become more costly to produce with a price on carbon, but it will also be more expensive when it is sold, and this could create an extra margin of profit for the producers of Fuel A, and they could then return higher dividends to their shareholders. Why should investors stop holding stocks in Fuel A when their rates of return are higher ?
If neither consumers nor investors are going to change their practice because Fuel A becomes more costly than Fuel B because of a price on carbon, then the oil and gas company are not going to transition out of Fuel A resources.
For Shell to urge a price on carbon therefore, is a delegation of responsibility for change to other actors. This is irresponsible. Shell needs to lead on emissions reduction, not insist that other people change.
2. A price on carbon will not change overall prices or purchasing decsions
In economic theory, choices about products, goods and services are based on key factors such as trust in the supplier, confidence in the product, availability and sustainability of the service, and, of course, the price. Price is a major determinant in most markets, and artificially altering the price of a vital commodity will certainly alter purchasing decisions – unless, that is, the price of the commodity in question increases across the board. If all the players in the field start offering a more expensive product, for example, because of supply chain issues felt across the market, then consumers will not change their choices.
Now consider the global markets in energy. Upwards of 80% of all energy consumed in the global economy is fossil fuel-based. Putting a price on carbon will raise the prices of energy pretty much universally. There will not be enough cleaner, greener product to purchase, so most purchasing decisions will remain the same. Price differentiation in the energy market will not be established by asserting a price on carbon.
A key part of Shell’s argument is that price differentiation will occur because of a price on carbon, and that this will drive behaviour change, and yet there is nothing to suggest it could do that effectively.
3. A price on carbon will not enable Carbon Capture and Storage
Athough a key part of Shell’s argument about a price on carbon is the rationale that it would stimulate the growth in Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS), it seems unlikely that the world will ever agree to a price on carbon that would be sufficient to stimulate significant levels of CCS. A price on carbon will be deemed to be high enough when it creates a difference in the marginal extra production cost of a unit of one energy resource compared to another. A carbon price can only be argued for on the basis of this optimisation process – after all – a carbon price will be expected to be cost-efficient, and not punitive to markets. In other words, carbon prices will be tolerated if they tickle the final cost of energy, but not if they mangle with it. However, CCS could imply the use of 20% to 45% extra energy consumption at a facility or plant. In other words, CCS would create a parasitic load on energy resources that is not slim enough to be supported by a cost-optimal carbon price.
Some argue that the technology for CCS is improving, and that the parasitic load of CCS at installations could be reduced to around 10% to 15% extra energy consumption. However, it is hard to imagine a price on carbon that would pay even for this. And additionally, CCS will continue to require higher levels of energy consumption which is highly inefficient in the use of resources.
Shell’s argument that CCS is vital, and that a price on carbon can support CCS, is invalidated by this simple analysis.
4. Shell needs to be fully engaged in energy transition
Calling for a price on carbon diverts attention from the fact that Shell itself needs to transition out of fossil fuels in order for the world to decarbonise its energy.
Shell rightly says that they should stick to their “core capabilities” – in other words geology and chemistry, instead of wind power and solar power. However, they need to demonstrate that they are willing to act within their central business activities.
Prior to the explosion in the exploitation of deep geological hydrocarbon resources for liquid and gas fuels, there was an energy economy that used coal and chemistry to manufacture gas and liquid fuels. Manufactured gas could still replace Natural Gas, if there are climate, economic or technological limits to how much Natural Gas can be resourced or safely deployed. Of course, to meet climate policy goals, coal chemistry would need to be replaced by biomass chemistry, and significant development of Renewable Hydrogen technologies.
Within its own production facilities, Shell has the answers to meet this challenge. Instead of telling the rest of the world to change its economy and its behaviour, Shell should take up the baton of transition, and perfect its production of low carbon manufactured gas.Academic Freedom, Alchemical, Assets not Liabilities, Bait & Switch, Be Prepared, Behaviour Changeling, Big Picture, Big Society, British Biogas, Carbon Capture, Carbon Commodities, Carbon Pricing, Carbon Recycling, Carbon Taxatious, Change Management, Climate Change, Coal Hell, Conflict of Interest, Corporate Pressure, Cost Effective, Dead End, Dead Zone, Delay and Deny, Design Matters, Direction of Travel, Divest and Survive, Dreamworld Economics, Emissions Impossible, Energy Change, Energy Revival, Engineering Marvel, Extreme Energy, Fossilised Fuels, Freemarketeering, Gamechanger, Geogingerneering, Green Gas, Green Investment, Green Power, Growth Paradigm, Hydrocarbon Hegemony, Hydrogen Economy, Low Carbon Life, Mad Mad World, Major Shift, Marvellous Wonderful, Mass Propaganda, Modern Myths, Money Sings, Natural Gas, Nudge & Budge, Oil Change, Orwells, Paradigm Shapeshifter, Peak Coal, Peak Emissions, Peak Energy, Peak Natural Gas, Peak Oil, Pet Peeves, Petrolheads, Policy Warfare, Political Nightmare, Price Control, Protest & Survive, Public Relations, Realistic Models, Regulatory Ultimatum, Renewable Gas, Renewable Resource, Resource Curse, Solar Sunrise, Solution City, Sustainable Deferment, Technofix, The Myth of Innovation, The Power of Intention, The Price of Gas, The Price of Oil, The Right Chemistry, The Science of Communitagion, The War on Error, Wind of Fortune
Posted on June 2nd, 2015 No comments
Although The Guardian newspaper employs intelligent people, sometimes they don’t realise they’ve been duped into acting as a mouthpiece for corporate propaganda. The “strapline” for the organisation is “Owned by no one. Free to say anything.”, and so it seemed like a major coup to be granted an interview with Ben Van Beurden of Royal Dutch Shell, recorded for a podcast that was uploaded on 29th May 2015.
However, the journalists, outoing editor Alan Rusbridger, Damian Carrington and Terry McAllister probably didn’t fully appreciate that this was part of an orchestrated piece of public relations. The same day as the podcast was published, Shell, along with five other oil and gas companies wrote a letter to officials of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
In the letter to Christiana Figueres and Laurent Fabius of the UNFCCC, Shell and fellow companies BP, BG Group, Eni, Total and Statoil, wrote that they appreciate the risks of the “critical challenge” of climate change and that they “stand ready to play their part”. After listing their contributions towards a lower carbon energy economy, they wrote :-
“For us to do more, we need governments across the world to provide us with clear, stable, long-term, ambitious policy frameworks. This would reduce uncertainty and help stimulate investments in the right low carbon technologies and the right resources at the right pace.”
“We believe that a price on carbon should be a key element of these frameworks. If governments act to price carbon, this discourages high carbon options and encourages the most efficient ways of reducing emissions widely, including reduced demand for the most carbon intensive fossil fuels, greater energy efficiency, the use of natural gas in place of coal, increased investment in carbon capture and storage, renewable energy, smart buildings and grids, off-grid access to energy, cleaner cars and new mobility business models and behaviors.”
The obvious problem with this call is that the oil and gas companies are pushing responsibility for change out to other actors in the economy, namely, the governments; yet the governments have been stymied at every turn by the lobbying of the oil and gas companies – a non-virtuous cycle of pressure. Where is the commitment by the oil and gas companies to act regardless of regulatory framework ?
I think that many of the technological and efficiency gains mentioned above can be achieved without pricing carbon, and I also think that efforts to assert a price on carbon dioxide emissions will fail to achieve significant change. Here are my top five reasons :-
1. Large portions of the economy will probably be ringfenced from participating in a carbon market or have exemptions from paying a carbon tax. There will always be special pleading, and it is likely that large industrial concerns, and centralised transportation such as aviation, will be able to beat back at a liability for paying for carbon dioxide emissions. Large industrial manufacture will be able to claim that their business is essential in sustaining the economy, so they should not be subject to a price on carbon. International industry and aviation, because of its international nature, will be able to claim that a carbon tax or a market in carbon could infringe their cross-border rights to trade without punitive regulatory charges.
2. Those who dig up carbon will not pay the carbon price. Fossil fuel producers will pass any carbon costs placed on them to the end consumers of fossil fuels. A price on carbon will inevitably make the cost of energy more expensive for every consumer, since somewhere in the region of 80% of global energy is fossil fuel-derived. Customers do not have a non-carbon option to turn to, so will be forced to pay the carbon charges.
3. A price on carbon dioxide emissions will not stop energy producers digging up carbon. An artificial re-levelising of the costs of high carbon energy will certainly deter some projects from going ahead, as they will become unprofitable – such as heavy oil, tar sands and remote oil, such as in the Arctic. However, even with jiggled energy prices from a price on carbon, fossil fuel producers will continue to dig up carbon and sell it to be burned into the sky.
4. A price on carbon dioxide emissions is being touted as a way to incentivise carbon capture and storage (CCS) by the authors of the letter – and we’ve known since they first started talking about CCS in the 1990s that they believe CCS can wring great change. Yet CCS will only be viable at centralised facilities, such as mines and power plants. It will not be possible to apply CCS in transport, or in millions of homes with gas-fired boilers.
5. A price on carbon dioxide emissions will not cause the real change that is needed – the world should as far as possible stop digging up carbon and burning it into the sky. What fossil carbon that still enters energy systems should be recycled where possible, using Renewable Gas technologies, and any other carbon that enters the energy systems should be sourced from renewable resources such as biomass.Academic Freedom, Advertise Freely, Alchemical, Arctic Amplification, Assets not Liabilities, Bait & Switch, Be Prepared, Big Picture, Carbon Capture, Carbon Commodities, Carbon Pricing, Carbon Recycling, Carbon Taxatious, Change Management, Climate Change, Conflict of Interest, Corporate Pressure, Delay and Deny, Divest and Survive, Dreamworld Economics, Emissions Impossible, Energy Change, Extreme Energy, Financiers of the Apocalypse, Fossilised Fuels, Freemarketeering, Gamechanger, Green Gas, Hydrocarbon Hegemony, Low Carbon Life, Mad Mad World, Major Shift, Mass Propaganda, Media, Money Sings, Natural Gas, Near-Natural Disaster, No Pressure, Not In My Name, Orwells, Paradigm Shapeshifter, Policy Warfare, Political Nightmare, Price Control, Protest & Survive, Public Relations, Pure Hollywood, Regulatory Ultimatum, Renewable Gas, Stirring Stuff, Sustainable Deferment, Tarred Sands, The Right Chemistry, The Science of Communitagion, The War on Error, Wasted Resource, Western Hedge
Posted on June 1st, 2015 No comments
And so it has begun – Shell’s public relations offensive ahead of the 2015 Paris climate talks. The substance of their “advocacy” – and for a heavyweight corporation, it’s less lobbying than badgering – is that the rest of the world should adapt. Policymakers should set a price on carbon, according to Shell. A price on carbon might make some dirty, polluting energy projects unprofitable, and there’s some value in that. A price on carbon might also stimulate a certain amount of Carbon Capture and Storage, or CCS, the capturing and permanent underground sequestration of carbon dioxide at large mines, industrial plant and power stations. But how much CCS could be incentivised by pricing carbon is still unclear. Egging on the rest of the world to price carbon would give Shell the room to carry on digging up carbon and burning it and then capturing it and burying it – because energy prices would inevitably rise to cover this cost. Shell continues with the line that they started in the 1990s – that they should continue to dig up carbon and burn it, or sell it to other people to burn, and that the rest of the world should continue to pay for the carbon to be captured and buried – but Shell has not answered a basic problem. As any physicist could tell you, CCS is incredibly energy-inefficient, which makes it cost-inefficient. A price on carbon wouldn’t solve that. It would be far more energy-efficient, and therefore cost-efficient, to either not dig up the carbon in the first place, or, failing that, recycle carbon dioxide into new energy. Shell have the chemical prowess to recycle carbon dioxide into Renewable Gas, but they are still not planning to do it. They are continuing to offer us the worst of all possible worlds. They are absolutely right to stick to their “core capabilities” – other corporations can ramp up renewable electricity such as wind and solar farms – but Shell does chemistry, so it is appropriate for them to manufacture Renewable Gas. They are already using most of the basic process steps in their production of synthetic crude in Canada, and their processing of coal and biomass in The Netherlands. They need to join the dots and aim for Renewable Gas. This will be far less expensive, and much more efficient, than Carbon Capture and Storage. The world does not need to shoulder the expense and effort of setting a price on carbon. Shell and its fellow fossil fuel companies need to transition out to Renewable Gas.Academic Freedom, Alchemical, Assets not Liabilities, Be Prepared, Big Number, Big Picture, British Biogas, Carbon Capture, Carbon Commodities, Carbon Pricing, Carbon Recycling, Climate Change, Coal Hell, Conflict of Interest, Corporate Pressure, Delay and Deny, Demoticratica, Divest and Survive, Dreamworld Economics, Efficiency is King, Emissions Impossible, Energy Calculation, Energy Change, Energy Denial, Energy Revival, Engineering Marvel, Environmental Howzat, Extreme Energy, Financiers of the Apocalypse, Fossilised Fuels, Freemarketeering, Gamechanger, Geogingerneering, Green Gas, Green Investment, Green Power, Hydrocarbon Hegemony, Hydrogen Economy, Low Carbon Life, Major Shift, Mass Propaganda, Modern Myths, Natural Gas, Not In My Name, Nudge & Budge, Paradigm Shapeshifter, Peak Emissions, Policy Warfare, Political Nightmare, Price Control, Protest & Survive, Public Relations, Pure Hollywood, Realistic Models, Regulatory Ultimatum, Renewable Gas, Renewable Resource, Social Capital, Solar Sunrise, Solution City, Sustainable Deferment, Tarred Sands, Technofix, Technological Sideshow, The Power of Intention, The Price of Gas, The Price of Oil, The Right Chemistry, The Science of Communitagion, Unconventional Foul, Ungreen Development, Wasted Resource, Western Hedge, Wind of Fortune, Zero Net
Posted on May 29th, 2015 No comments
As if to provide proof for the sneaking suspicion that Great Britain is run by the wealthy, rather than by the people, and that energy policy is decided by a close-knit circle of privileged dynasties, up bubbles Amber Rudd MP’s first whirl of skirmish as Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change : her brother Roland is chairperson of a lobbying firm, Finsbury, which is seeking to get state approval for a controversial gas storage scheme at Preesall, near Fleetwood, on behalf of the developers, Halite Energy of Preston, Lancashire.
Whilst some claim there is a starkly obvious conflict of interest for Rudd to take part in the decision-making process, the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) could have denied it, but have instead confirmed that the potential reversal of a 2013 decision will be made, not by Rudd, but by Lord Bourne.
New gas storage in the United Kingdom is a crucial piece of the energy infrastructure provision, as recognised by successive governments. Developments have been ongoing, such as the opening of the Holford facility at Byley in Cheshire. Besides new gas storage, there are anticipated improvements for interconnectors with mainland Europe. These are needed for raising the volume of Natural Gas available to the British market, and for optimising Natural Gas flows and sales in the European regional context – a part of the EC’s “Energy Union”.
An underlying issue not much aired is that increased gas infrastructure is necessary not just to improve competition in the energy markets – it is also to compensate for Peak Natural Gas in the North Sea – something many commentators regularly strive to deny. The new Conservative Government policy on energy is not fit to meet this challenge. The new Secretary of State has gone public about the UK Government’s continued commitment to the exploitation of shale gas – a resource that even her own experts can tell her is unlikely to produce more than a footnote to annual gas supplies for several decades. In addition, should David Cameron be forced to usher in a Referendum on Europe, and the voters petulantly pull out of the Europe project, Britain’s control over Natural Gas imports is likely to suffer, either because of the failure of the “Energy Union” in markets and infrastructure, or because of cost perturbations.
Amber Rudd MP is sitting on a mountain of trouble, undergirded by energy policy vapourware : the promotion of shale gas is not going to solve Britain’s gas import surge; the devotion to new nuclear power is not going to bring new atomic electrons to the grid for decades, and the UK Continental Shelf is going to be expensive for the Treasury to incentivise to mine. What Amber needs is a proper energy policy, based on focused support for low carbon technologies, such as wind power, solar power and Renewable Gas to back up renewable electricity when the sun is not shining and wind is not blowing.Academic Freedom, Assets not Liabilities, Be Prepared, Big Picture, British Biogas, Burning Money, Carbon Commodities, Conflict of Interest, Corporate Pressure, Dead End, Demoticratica, Direction of Travel, Disturbing Trends, Energy Autonomy, Energy Change, Energy Insecurity, Energy Revival, Extreme Energy, Fossilised Fuels, Freemarketeering, Green Gas, Green Power, Growth Paradigm, Hydrocarbon Hegemony, Low Carbon Life, Mad Mad World, Major Shift, National Energy, National Power, Natural Gas, No Pressure, Nuclear Nuisance, Nuclear Shambles, Oil Change, Paradigm Shapeshifter, Peak Energy, Peak Natural Gas, Peak Oil, Petrolheads, Policy Warfare, Political Nightmare, Price Control, Realistic Models, Renewable Gas, Renewable Resource, Resource Curse, Resource Wards, Revolving Door, Shale Game, Social Chaos, Social Democracy, Solar Sunrise, Solution City, The Data, The Price of Gas, The Price of Oil, The Right Chemistry, The War on Error, Unconventional Foul, Ungreen Development, Unnatural Gas, Utter Futility, Vain Hope, Wasted Resource, Wind of Fortune
Posted on April 8th, 2015 No comments
Hello, hello; what have we here then ? Royal Dutch Shell buying out BG Group (formerly known as British Gas). Is this the start of the great transition out of petroleum oil into gas fuels ?
Volatile crude petroleum oil commodity prices over the last decade have played some undoubted havoc with oil and gas company strategy. High crude prices have pushed the choice of refinery feedstocks towards cheap heavy and immature gunk; influenced decisions about the choices for new petrorefineries and caused ripples of panic amongst trade and transport chiefs : you can’t keep the engine of globalisation ticking over if the key fuel is getting considerably more expensive, and you can’t meet your carbon budgets without restricting supplies.
Low crude commodity prices have surely caused oil and gas corporation leaders to break out into the proverbial sweat. Heavy oil, deep oil, and complicated oil suddenly become unprofitable to mine, drill and pump. Because the economic balance of refinery shifts. Because low commodity prices must translate into low end user refined product prices.
There maybe isn’t an ideal commodity price for crude oil. All the while, as crude oil commodity prices jump around like a medieval flea, the price of Natural Gas, and the gassy “light ends” of slightly unconventional and deep crude oil, stay quite cheap to produce and cheap to use. It’s a shame that there are so many vehicles on the road/sea/rails that use liquid fuels…all this is very likely to change.
Shell appear to be consolidating their future gas business by buying out the competition. Hurrah for common sense ! The next stage of their evolution, after the transition of all oil applications to gas, will be to ramp up Renewable Gas production : low carbon gas supplies will decarbonise every part of the economy, from power generation, to transport, to heating, to industrial chemistry.
This is a viable low carbon solution – to accelerate the use of renewable electricity – wind power and solar principally – and at the same time, transition the oil and gas companies to become gas companies, and thence to Renewable Gas companies.Academic Freedom, Be Prepared, Big Picture, Carbon Commodities, Change Management, Corporate Pressure, Design Matters, Direction of Travel, Energy Change, Energy Crunch, Energy Insecurity, Energy Revival, Extreme Energy, Feel Gooder, Fossilised Fuels, Fuel Poverty, Green Gas, Growth Paradigm, Hydrocarbon Hegemony, Hydrogen Economy, Low Carbon Life, Major Shift, Marine Gas, Marvellous Wonderful, Methane Management, Money Sings, Natural Gas, No Blood For Oil, Oil Change, Paradigm Shapeshifter, Peak Emissions, Peak Oil, Petrolheads, Policy Warfare, Political Nightmare, Price Control, Realistic Models, Regulatory Ultimatum, Renewable Gas, Renewable Resource, Resource Wards, Solar Sunrise, Solution City, Tarred Sands, Technofix, The Power of Intention, The Price of Gas, The Price of Oil, The Right Chemistry, Transport of Delight, Unconventional Foul, Unnatural Gas, Western Hedge, Wind of Fortune, Zero Net
Posted on March 24th, 2015 No comments
This evening I attended an interesting meeting hosted by the Energy Institute, and held at the Royal College of Nursing in Cavendish Square, London. The speaker for the event was Dr Scott Milne, of the Energy Technologies Institute (ETI), who introduced us in a “meet the public” way to the recent launch of two sample scenarios for the future of Britain’s energy : “Clockwork” and “Patchwork” from the ETI’s Energy System Modelling Environment (ESME).
What follows is me typing up my notes that I made this evening. It is not intended to be a literal or verbatim, word-for-word record of Dr Milne’s words, as I took the notes longhand and slowly. Where I have put things in square brackets ( [ ] ), they are my additions.
[ Before the talk, I chat with somebody whose name I didn’t catch, who in all honesty asked me whether I thought fusion nuclear energy would be a likely energy technology choice by 2050. ]
So, what is the ETI ? It’s a public-private partnership, aimed at de-risking various technologies and technology families. We receive funding from BP, Shell, EdF, Caterpillar, Rolls-Royce […] We have a large number of stakeholders who take the work we put out for tender to be done. We aim to build internally-consistent models – using “exogenous assumptions” [ externally-imposed ]. We have about 250 profiles in the model – costs are added in. The ESME modelling is policy-neutral – unless where we intervene to state otherwise – for example, to say no nuclear power, or Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) to be applied later rather than sooner. Our starting point is existing stocks of energy installations as of 2010, which are gradually retired out, and we are subject to supply chain constraints in replacing them. How quickly can we deploy new solutions ? We have a “spatial disaggregation” in the model – with 12 separate regions of the UK. We have offshore nodes, and storage points, and carbon dioxide capture and storage is pushed offshore. Our modelling is not as finely detailed as the National Grid’s power dispatch model. We have seasons, and five parts of a day – a model suitable for load balancing purposes. We assume a 1-in-20 risk of a cold snap – a “peak day” of consumption. There is a probabilistic element for each technology on cost, and the modelling is done using the Monte Carlo method (repeated random model runs). This helps us to identify which technologies are optimal. Our partners DECC (Her Majesty’s Government Department of Energy and Climate Change) and CCC (Committee on Climate Change) are users of the model, and the model provides an evidence base for them. The low carbon energy research models (ESME) are used by some academic groups. We came public with these for the first time this year, and we launched on 4th March 2015.
In the “Clockwork” scenario, transport continues to be liquid fuel options as we have today, and using carbon offsets from elsewhere in the energy system. There are a few things we need to believe as part of this scenario. We need to accept the “negative emissions” possibilities of Carbon Capture and Storage combined with biomass (Biomass+CCS) – this is still certainly open to question. By 2050 there should be ultra-low carbon vehicles. These two scenarios “Clockwork” and “Patchwork” are not extremes as in some modelling done elsewhere – they are more balanced between the two. The “Clockwork” scenario is not about decisions made at the household level – whereas “Patchwork” is – it involves engagement from householders, and includes influences and constraints besides decarbonisation – for example, the cost of energy and air quality. In the “Patchwork” scenario there is a limited role for biomass in space heating, and you see a greater push for low carbon transport. Plus, space heating is decarbonised in parallel [ partly through demand reduction ].
In “Patchwork” there is less central governance. You see experimentation in different regions, and only at the end see which technologies have been picked. There is a stronger burden on households in “Patchwork”, and more emphasis on renewable energy. Coal is switched off in both scenarios by 2030, and it is not replaced by coal-with-Carbon-Capture-and-Storage (Coal+CCS) but with Natural-Gas-with-Carbon-Capture-and-Storage (Gas+CCS). In the “Clockwork” scenario there is still a role for renewable energy, but not so significant. Hydrogen gas turbine generation takes over the “peaker plant” (on-the-spot generation at peak demand) role from Gas+CCS. The hydrogen comes from Biomass+CCS. There is large scale geological storage of hydrogen. In the “Patchwork” scenario, offshore wind plays a major role – the model assumes that the land available for onshore wind is capped (that’s a choice). Solar power is also a big factor in “Patchwork”, but still making a fairly modest contribution by 2050. Also, there is an assumption that biomass contributes directly for power generation. In the “Patchwork” scenario, solar power makes a major contribution to capacity (gigawatts) but less to generation (terawatt hours).
As regards space heating (the heating of the insides of buildings) : in the “Clockwork” scenario, heat pumps make a major contribution – and there are big step changes in the final decades compared to “Patchwork”. Gas boilers are being built for the 1-in-20 year cold snaps – but not for the home [ – for district heating ]. There is a high demand for heat in the “Clockwork” scenario – where householders are “comfort takers” and homes may be heated to 21 degrees Celsius. In the “Patchwork” scenario, people have more engagement with the management of energy, better at managing their use of energy at home, and so less heat is used. There is a strong role for retrofits [ for insulation for energy demand reduction ] behind the scenes. Population continues to grow and the number of individual households continues to grow.
As regards transport : Heavy Goods Vehicles (HGV) and Light Duty Vehicles (LDV) are important (although the graph only shows cars). In “Patchwork” there is a move towards urban living – and so people will be thinking more about how transport can be done – car pooling and car sharing. In “Clockwork”, we are seeing aspirations – people flash the cash – and pay more to do more. The Biomass+CCS carbon dioxide emissions offsets create more headroom for transport emissions in “Clockwork”. The model could explore lowering demand for transport – through a shift to gas from liquid fuels – fuel/gas hybrids actually [dual fuel]. There are implications for liquid fuel – significant in both cases. There are therefore implications for fuell stations – for example, if cars are coming to the forecourt less often for fuel because of vehicle fuel use efficiency. We need to maintain the liquid fuelling infrastructure – but we need electric vehicle charging and give hydrogen refuelling infrastructure as well. There is quite an overlap in investment. Even if we stop selling liquid fuel vehicles, they will stay on the road for some time – we assume 13 years.
In terms of what it means – in terms of cost compared to its fossil fuel “dark cousin” [ business as usual trajectory ] : “Patchwork” works out to be more expensive – these graphs show capex only [ capital expenditure on investment in assets and infrastructure ]. For “Patchwork” [ although capex is higher ], the resource cost is less [ owing to more renewable energy being sourced. ] These graphs give an idea of when money needs to be spent and how much – it’s not insignificant [ between 1.4 and 1.6 % of GDP ? ] To make the investments, buildings and space heating could be considered infrastructure [ and need central spending ? ] The costs of transport are heavier in “Patchwork”. Both have “negative emissions” (from Biomass+CCS). By having “negative emissions”, you are allowed to have some of these fossil fuel options. This is important as air travel and shipping will need fossil fuels. You cannot fly aeroplanes on hydrogen, for example. The outlook for industry takes a bit more explaining.
Taking action over the next decade is a no-regrets option. We need to replace energy installations – replacing them with low carbon options gives only a marginal extra cost. We lose very little by hedging – even if carbon action doesn’t take place. Developing the technologies enhances export capability – at least we will not be an importer. If we wait to implement low carbon technologies, we have less time for the transition. This model operates over a timescale of 35 years. Development of the technologies will involve some degree of redundancy [ not all developments will be useful going forward ], but we need to prove them up, cost them out. If we wait until it is clear we must act, we will have to jump to things that are not yet costed up. If there are no technological solutions worked out, we might have to slash energy demand – which would politically be very challenging – you can imagine how people would react to having a cap on the energy they are permitted to use at home. If we attempt to make an 80% reduction in carbon dioxide emissions later on, we will have higher cumulative [ overall ] emissions – and as a result we would need tougher carbon emissions cuts.
Things we have concluded from this modelling : we are not yet at a stage where we need to say definitively what needs to be used, for example, decide for nuclear power, CCS etc. Biomass+CCS is challenging – there are questions around the lifecycle carbon dioxide emissions. But if we don’t have it, it doubles the abatement cost. We have shown that a high level of intermittent renewable energy in the power sector is quite manageable – we can use the excess in renewable electricity generation for building up renewable heat – for example hydrogen electrolysis for hydrogen production [ “Power to Gas” or “WindGas” ] – which is not modelled. We hope these two scenarios can be a starting point.
[ Questions and Answers ]
[ Question from the floor ]
[ Answer from Dr Milne ] …For solar power we assumed the lowest cost profile. There are various studies for LCOE – Levelised Cost of Energy [ Levelised Cost of Electricity ] – they are not showing wider system integration costs – for example, the extra storage needed [ for excess generation that needs to be stored somehow for later use, when the sun has set ]. “Counterfactuals” – is this useful in this case or that case or … ? Model a whole range of scenarios around that.
[ Question from William Orchard ] Results all depend on assumptions in the models. How doees it treat waste fossil heat [ heat from burning fossil fuels for power generation at centralised power plants ] ? The European Union treats renewable heat dumped in the sea as renewable [ ? ] but considers waste heat in […] as non-renewable – the difference is significant. It also depends on your COPs [ coefficient of performance ] in district heating networks. Did you model nuclear reactor CHP [ combined heat and power ] ? What COPs did you use for the heat networks ? How did you treat biomass emissions ?
[ Answer from Dr Milne ] We don’t have to consider what the EU thinks. We do have an option to meet the RED targets [ Renewable Energy Directive ]. Waste heat from large scale power plants plays a huge role in our model – free heat. We build pipelines to link waste heat sources to networks. Question – how to build the heat network ? We need to justify building big pipelines to transport heat. [ Why not transport the heat in the form of gas ? That is, use the waste power plant heat to manufacture gas to distribute to local CHP schemes via a much smaller pipeline than a heat pipeline would need ? ] For Biomass CHP, we considered a range of scales. We gave it a 92% carbon credit. We also have biomass imports in the scenario – a 67% carbon credit. It’s a “pump”. Do we think we can ? We take an off-model view first of all and then apply it to the model.
[ Question from the floor ] This work is well overdue. Thank you for doing it. You say you will change from coal to gas. Why are you not considering more offshore wind – you can expect to bring on nuclear power more slowly ? I’m worried when you put in 60 more years of gas when you put Gas+CCS in. Have you considered fracking [ for shale gas ] ?
[ Answer from Dr Milne ] In the “Clockwork” scenario, it relies on [ strong early development in ] nuclear and CCS mostly – there is a stronger role for renewable energy in “Patchwork”. “Patchwork” is the more moderate speed [ of development of nuclear power and CCS ] as old capacity retires – this is why there is a role and space for other technologies. What the model wants is gas – but it’s not saying where that gas is coming from.
[ Question from the floor ] Have you put any cap on gas ?
[ Answer from Dr Milne ] The only new gas built is CCGT+CCS (Natural Gas-fired Combined Cycle Gas Turbine plus CCS). As you get more [ stringent carbon controls ] will need hydrogen turbines.
[ Question from the floor ] What are the key parameters that break the model ? That you can’t do without ?
[ Answer from Dr Milne ] Biomass+CCS for sure. If you make a lot of assumptions – such as no extra energy demand – then yeah, we’ll be fine. Otherwise, we need Biomass+CCS.
[ Question from the floor ] Where do you get your metrics from ? Isn’t District Heating less efficient than people say ? Isn’t there an anti-competition issue – as District Heating is a single source of supply ? And what about the parasitic loads ? And what happens if there’s not such a big demand for heat [ for example, due to high levels of building insulation ] ?
[ Answer from Dr Milne ] We used central projections from government – we test the cost of energy. Our members used to build some of this stuff. We replace data sets with studies – more independent sources. We have diversified out data set over time. The District Heating networks – it will need a different way of doing markets. It may not be policies that stop you… We assume that 90% of the housing stock remains – we see “difficult households” – not “low-hanging fruits” [ ripe for change ]. We envisage these will need complex packages – if you think it’s going to be received. We need to work this up more.
[ Question from the floor ] Have you calculated the carbon emissions ?
[ Answer from Dr Milne ] Zero or negative. The power sector is 100% de-carbonised by 2030. I can get the figures from our database – gCO2/kWh
[ Question from William Orchard ] MARKAL (previously favourite energy modelling tool) was not fit for purpose for modelling heat networks… MacKay…
[ Answer from Dr Milne ] MARKAL has been shelved, replaced by UK-TIMES…
[ Question from William Orchard ] …fundamentally has the same problem as MARKAL – uses the same algorithms. It wasn’t able to generate appropriate answers to the question of whether it was cost-effective to build heat networks…
[ Answer from Dr Milne ] We use the Biomass Value Chain Model (BVCM). This is new and includes hydrogen and CCS. We include the “tortuosity factor” (kinkiness) of pipeline layout. We model 9 types of buildings. With a hydrogen network – would you want to start small, for example with distributing cannisters… ?
[ Wrap up ]
Posted on March 23rd, 2015 No comments
At a presentation I recently gave at Birkbeck, University of London, I introduced the British situation as regards Natural Gas production, consumption and the consequent trend towards import dependency – within the context of import dependency for all energy use in the UK :-
There are several reasons why a continued dependency on imported Natural Gas is a risk to the British economy. First of all, it makes the economy dependent on the commodity price of Natural Gas. Should there continue to be a continued uptake in the use of Natural Gas in most regions of the world (and this is likely to be the case), this could put pressure on the commodity prices for Natural Gas, a significant factor in economic development that would therefore be out of the control of the British Government. Should the global commodity price for Natural Gas remain relatively low (and this is quite likely to be the case), this would benefit the UK economy. However, there is a risk that Natural Gas commodity prices could climb appreciably. If this were to happen, the UK economy would have to bear the brunt of higher energy prices, and the UK Government would have no control over the cost of one of the key energy flows into the economy.
Although the global supply of Natural Gas is likely to be healthy for the next 20 years, the price of Natural Gas could change in impactful ways. So – likelihood of scarcity ? Small. Negative economic impact outside of control ? Possibly.
The temptation would be to avoid major energy projects and just rely on Natural Gas by default. However, this carries a small but not negligible risk of supply constraints, and a larger risk of economic damage from uncontrollable prices.
So where is policy on this ?
I have been taking a little look at the output of the Energy Technologies Institute (ETI) and their modelling tool ESME (Energy System Modelling Environment). They have recently launched their summary of their “Clockwork” and “Patchwork” scenarios. Their modelling could be expected to reflect UK Government energy policy fairly accurately, so it’s interesting to see the results :-
In the “Clockwork” scenario, there is a heavy emphasis on nuclear power – the total generating capacity is expected to be 40 gigawatts by 2050. What needs to be understood is that this requires at least 40 + 16 = 56GW of new build nuclear power plants, as the current 16GW in operation is all expected to need decommissioning in the 2020s. Considering the battle to sign off just 3.2GW for Hinkley Point C in England and another 3.2GW for Sizewell C in England, and a further 5.4GW at Wylfa, in Wales, this could be a significant challenge. The companies that are being asked to build and finance these new power plants may not be sufficiently stable to complete these mega-power projects. In addition, there are legal challenges to the state subsidies being offered for new nuclear power, and questions still not answered about the liabilities of the end of life of nuclear power plants, including the disposal of radioactive spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste.
So, even if policy does proceed like clockwork, there is a risk to this strategy – and that risk is the default dependency on Natural Gas, resorting to the use of Natural Gas, should the nuclear power plants not come online.
In the “Patchwork” scenario there is a massive dependence on offshore wind power, and although the support structures for this to happen are more secure than for new nuclear power, there is a danger that government subsidies for new nuclear power could crowd out investment in true low carbon renewable energy, including offshore wind power. Again, in this scenario of patchwork energy sector development, the default position would be Natural Gas, if the offshore wind power could not be brought online for reasons of initial financing or resistance from recalcitrant actors, such as disbelievers in renewable electricity that still occupy positions of influence. A continuing high dependence on Natural Gas would leave the country open to risks of economic and energy insecurity.
The truth is probably that neither “Clockwork” nor “Patchwork” reflect the future accurately, and I would suggest that since Natural Gas is likely to be the “fallback” position, this backstop needs supporting – with the development of Renewable Gas.
Posted on March 12th, 2015 No comments
The deadline races towards me, so I must edit like the wind on a blowy day, in a Scottish valley, in storm season.
In order for it not to be too long, my opus “Clean Burn : The Transition to Renewable Gas” has calved an iceberg of a technical essay, which will now live its own independent life. Engineers are probably the most likely people to be interested in reading this detailed exploration of the subject, and engineers are but a small subset of the population, and so the technical bits can be safely referenced, rather than included inline, in the main argument I have built.
Posted on March 12th, 2015 No comments
I have been writing a truly epic saga about a transition in the energy economy from fossil fuels to low carbon gas, and as I reached the final stages of editing, I discovered I’d written too much. Clearly, it is time to chop, trim and prune – but what to do with the extraneous material ? Publish it here, of course. First up, a fully linked bibliography that supports my work. The working title for the eventual work is “Clean Burn : The Transition to Renewable Gas”. I find that fairly encapsulatory, personally.
Posted on March 5th, 2015 1 comment
There are many ways to make a living, but there appear to be zero careers in plainspeaking.
I mean, who could I justify working with, or for ? And would any of them be prepared to accept me speaking my mind ?
Much of what I’ve been saying over the last ten years has been along the lines of “that will never work”, but people generally don’t get consulted or hired for picking holes in an organisation’s pet projects or business models.
Could I imagine myself taking on a role in the British Government ? Short answer : no.
The slightly longer answer : The British Government Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) ? No, they’re still hooked on the failed technology of nuclear power, the stupendously expensive and out-of-reach Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS), and the mythical beast of shale gas. OK, so they have a regular “coffee club” about Green Hydrogen (whatever that turns out to be according to their collective ruminations), and they’ve commissioned reports on synthetic methane, but I just couldn’t imagine they’re ever going to work up a serious plan on Renewable Gas. The British Government Department for Transport ? No, they still haven’t adopted a clear vision of the transition of the transport sector to low carbon energy. They’re still chipping away at things instead of coming up with a strategy.
Could I imagine myself taking on a role with a British oil and gas multinational ? Short and very terse and emphatic answer : no.
The extended answer : The oil and gas companies have had generous support and understanding from the world’s governments, and are respected and acclaimed. Yet they are in denial about “unburnable carbon” assets, and have dismissed the need for Energy Change that is the outcome of Peak Oil (whether on the supply or the demand side). Sneakily, they have also played both sides on Climate Change. Several major oil and gas companies have funded or in other ways supported Climate Change science denial. Additionally, the policy recommendations coming from the oil and gas companies are what I call a “delayer’s game”. For example, BP continues to recommend the adoption of a strong price on carbon, yet they know this would be politically unpalatable and take decades (if ever) to bring into effect. Shell continues to argue for extensive public subsidy support for Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS), knowing this would involve such huge sums of money, so it’s never going to happen, at least not for several decades. How on Earth could I work on any project with these corporations unless they adopt, from the centre, a genuine plan for transition out of fossil fuels ? I’m willing to accept that transition necessitates the continued use of Natural Gas and some petroleum for some decades, but BP and Royal Dutch Shell do need to have an actual plan for a transition to Renewable Gas and renewable power, otherwise I would be compromising everything I know by working with them.
Could I imagine myself taking on a role with a large engineering firm, such as Siemens, GE, or Alstom, taking part in a project on manufactured low carbon gas ? I suppose so. I mean, I’ve done an IT project with Siemens before. However, they would need to demonstrate that they are driving for a Renewable Gas transition before I could join a gas project with them. They might not want to be so bold and up-front about it, because they could risk the wrath of the oil and gas companies, whose business model would be destroyed by engineered gas and fuel solutions.
Could I imagine myself building fuel cells, or designing methanation catalysts, or improving hydrogen production, biocoke/biocoal manufacture or carbon dioxide capture from the oceans… with a university project ? Yes, but the research would need to be funded by companies (because all applied academic research is funded by companies) with a clear picture on Energy Change and their own published strategy on transition out of fossil fuels.
Could I imagine myself working on rolling out gas cars, buses and trucks ? Yes. The transition of the transport sector is the most difficult problem in Energy Change. However, apart from projects that are jumping straight to new vehicles running entirely on Hydrogen or Natural Gas, the good options for transition involve converting existing diesel engine vehicles to running mostly on Natural Gas, such as “dual fuel”, still needing roughly 20% of liquid diesel fuel for ignition purposes. So I would need to be involved with a project that aims to supply biodiesel, and have a plan to transition from Natural Gas to Renewable Gas.
Could I imagine myself working with a team that has extensive computing capabilities to model carbon dioxide recycling in power generation plant ? Yes.
Could I imagine myself modelling the use of hydrogen in petroleum refinery, and making technological recommendations for the oil and gas industry to manufacture Renewable Hydrogen ? Possibly. But I would need to be clear that I’m doing it to enable Energy Change, and not to prop up the fossil fuel paradigm – a game that is actually already bust and needs helping towards transition.
Could I imagine myself continuing to research the growth in Renewable Gas – both Renewable Hydrogen and Renewable Methane – in various countries and sectors ? Possibly. It’s my kind of fun, talking to engineers.
But whatever future work I consider myself doing, repeatedly I come up against this problem – whoever asked me to work with them would need to be aware that I do not tolerate non-solutions. I will continue to say what doesn’t work, and what cannot work.
If people want to pay me to tell them that what they’re doing isn’t working, and won’t work, then fine, I’ll take the role.
I’d much rather stay positive, though, and forge a role where I can promote the things that do work, can work and will work.
The project that I’m suitable for doesn’t exist yet, I feel. I’m probably going to continue in one way or another in research, and after that, since I cannot see a role that I could fit easily or ethically, I can see I’m going to have to write my own job description.Academic Freedom, Acid Ocean, Alchemical, Assets not Liabilities, Be Prepared, Big Picture, British Biogas, Carbon Capture, Carbon Commodities, Carbon Pricing, Carbon Taxatious, Change Management, Climate Change, Conflict of Interest, Corporate Pressure, Delay and Deny, Direction of Travel, Energy Autonomy, Energy Change, Energy Denial, Energy Revival, Engineering Marvel, Fossilised Fuels, Gas Storage, Green Gas, Green Investment, Green Power, Growth Paradigm, Hydrocarbon Hegemony, Hydrogen Economy, Low Carbon Life, Methane Management, Modern Myths, National Energy, National Power, Natural Gas, No Blood For Oil, Non-Science, Nuclear Nuisance, Nuclear Shambles, Oil Change, Optimistic Generation, Paradigm Shapeshifter, Policy Warfare, Political Nightmare, Protest & Survive, Realistic Models, Regulatory Ultimatum, Renewable Gas, Renewable Resource, Science Rules, Shale Game, Solution City, Stirring Stuff, Sustainable Deferment, Technofix, The Data, The Power of Intention, The Price of Gas, The Price of Oil, The Right Chemistry, Vote Loser, Wasted Resource, Zero Net
Posted on March 2nd, 2015 No comments
Last week, on the invitation of Dr Paul Elsner at Birkbeck, University of London, I gave a brief address of my research so far into Renewable Gas to this year’s Energy and Climate Change class, and asked and answered lots of questions before demolishing the mythical expert/student hierarchy paradigm – another incarnation of the “information deficit model”, perhaps – and proposed everyone work in breakout groups on how a transition from fossil fuel gas to Renewable Gas could be done.
A presentation of information was important before discussing strategies, as we had to cover ground from very disparate disciplines such as chemical process engineering, the petroleum industry, energy statistics, and energy technologies, to make sure everybody had a foundational framework. I tried to condense the engineering into just a few slides, following the general concept of UML – Unified Modelling Language – keeping everything really simple – especially as processing, or work flow (workflow) concepts can be hard to describe in words, so diagrams can really help get round the inevitable terminology confusions.
But before I dropped the class right into chemical engineering, I thought a good place to start would be in numbers, and in particular the relative contributions to energy in the United Kingdom from gas and electricity. Hence the first slide.
The first key point to notice is that most heat demand in the UK in winter is still provided by Natural Gas, whether Natural Gas in home boilers, or electricity generated using Natural Gas.
The second is that heat demand in energy terms is much larger than power demand in the cold months, and much larger than both power and heat demand in the warm months.
The third is that power demand when viewed on annual basis seems pretty regular (despite the finer grain view having issues with twice-daily peaks and weekday demand being much higher than weekends).
The reflection I gave was that it would make no sense to attempt to provide all that deep winter heat demand with electricity, as the UK would need an enormous amount of extra power generation, and in addition, much of this capacity would do nothing for most of the rest of the year.
The point I didn’t make was that nuclear power currently provides – according to official figures – less than 20% of UK electricity, however, this works out as only 7.48% of total UK primary energy demand (DUKES, 2014, Table 1.1.1, Mtoe basis). The contribution to total national primary energy demand from Natural Gas by contrast is 35.31%. The generation from nuclear power plants has been falling unevenly, and the plan to replace nuclear reactors that have reached their end of life is not going smoothly. The UK Government Department of Energy and Climate Change have been pushing for new nuclear power, and project that all heating will convert to electricity, and that nuclear power will provide for much of this (75 GW by 2050). But if their plan relies on nuclear power, and nuclear power development is unreliable, it is hard to imagine that it will succeed.Academic Freedom, Alchemical, Baseload is History, Be Prepared, Big Number, Big Picture, Big Society, British Biogas, Change Management, Climate Change, Dead End, Demoticratica, Dreamworld Economics, Efficiency is King, Electrificandum, Energy Autonomy, Energy Change, Energy Insecurity, Energy Revival, Engineering Marvel, Fossilised Fuels, Green Gas, Green Investment, Green Power, Hydrocarbon Hegemony, Methane Management, National Energy, National Power, Natural Gas, Nuclear Nuisance, Nuclear Shambles, Optimistic Generation, Paradigm Shapeshifter, Policy Warfare, Political Nightmare, Realistic Models, Regulatory Ultimatum, Renewable Gas, Solution City, Technofix, The Data, The Power of Intention, The Right Chemistry
Posted on February 8th, 2015 No comments
In the last couple of years I have researched and written a book about the technologies and systems of Renewable Gas – gas energy fuels that are low in net carbon dioxide emissions. From what I have learned so far, it seems that another energy world is possible, and that the transition is already happening. The forces that are shaping this change are not just climate or environmental policy, or concerns about energy security. Renewable Gas is inevitable because of a range of geological, economic and industrial reasons.
I didn’t train as a chemist or chemical process engineer, and I haven’t had a background in the fossil fuel energy industry, so I’ve had to look at a number of very basic areas of engineering, for example, the distillation and fractionation of crude petroleum oil, petroleum refinery, gas processing, and the thermodynamics of gas chemistry in industrial-scale reactors. Why did I need to look at the fossil fuel industry and the petrochemical industry when I was researching Renewable Gas ? Because that’s where a lot of the change can come from. Renewable Gas is partly about biogas, but it’s also about industrial gas processes, and a lot of them are used in the petrorefinery and chemicals sectors.
In addition, I researched energy system technologies. Whilst assessing the potential for efficiency gains in energy systems through the use of Renewable Electricity and Renewable Gas, I rekindled an interest in fuel cells. For the first time in a long time, I began to want to build something – a solid oxide fuel cell which switches mode to an electrolysis unit that produces hydrogen from water. Whether I ever get to do that is still a question, but it shows how involved I’m feeling that I want to roll up my sleeves and get my hands dirty.
Even though I have covered a lot of ground, I feel I’m only just getting started, as there is a lot more that I need to research and document. At the same time, I feel that I don’t have enough data, and that it will be hard to get the data I need, partly because of proprietary issues, where energy and engineering companies are protective of developments, particularly as regards actual numbers. Merely being a university researcher is probably not going to be sufficient. I would probably need to be an official within a government agency, or an industry institute, in order to be permitted to reach in to more detail about the potential for Renewable Gas. But there are problems with these possible avenues.
You see, having done the research I have conducted so far, I am even more scornful of government energy policy than I was previously, especially because of industrial tampering. In addition, I am even more scathing about the energy industry “playing both sides” on climate change. Even though there are some smart and competent people in them, the governments do not appear to be intelligent enough to see through expensive diversions in technology or unworkable proposals for economic tweaking. These non-solutions are embraced and promoted by the energy industry, and make progress difficult. No, carbon dioxide emissions taxation or pricing, or a market in carbon, are not going to make the kind of changes we need on climate change; and in addition they are going to be extremely difficult and slow to implement. No, Carbon Capture and Storage, or CCS, is never going to become relatively affordable in any economic scenario. No, nuclear power is too cumbersome, slow and dodgy – a technical term – to ever make a genuine impact on the total of carbon emissons. No, it’s not energy users who need to reduce their consumption of energy, it’s the energy companies who need to reduce the levels of fossil fuels they utilise in the energy they sell. No, unconventional fossil fuels, such as shale gas, are not the answer to high emissions from coal. No, biofuels added to petrofuels for vehicles won’t stem total vehicle emissions without reducing fuel consumption and limiting the number of vehicles in use.
I think that the fossil fuel companies know these proposals cannot bring about significant change, which is precisely why they lobby for them. They used to deny climate change outright, because it spelled the end of their industry. Now they promote scepticism about the risks of climate change, whilst at the same time putting their name to things that can’t work to suppress major amounts of emissions. This is a delayer’s game.
Because I find the UK Government energy and climate policy ridiculous on many counts, I doubt they will ever want me to lead with Renewable Gas on one of their projects. And because I think the energy industry needs to accept and admit that they need to undergo a major change, and yet they spend most of their public relations euros telling the world they don’t need to, and that other people need to make change instead, I doubt the energy industry will ever invite me to consult with them on how to make the Energy Transition.
I suppose there is an outside chance that the major engineering firms might work with me, after all, I have been an engineer, and many of these companies are already working in the Renewable Gas field, although they’re normally “third party” players for the most part – providing engineering solutions to energy companies.
Because I’ve had to drag myself through the equivalent of a “petro degree”, learning about the geology and chemistry of oil and gas, I can see more clearly than before that the fossil fuel industry contains within it the seeds of positive change, with its use of technologies appropriate for manufacturing low carbon “surface gas”. I have learned that Renewable Gas would be a logical progression for the oil and gas industry, and also essential to rein in their own carbon emissions from processing cheaper crude oils. If they weren’t so busy telling governments how to tamper with energy markets, pushing the blame for emissions on others, and begging for subsidies for CCS projects, they could instead be planning for a future where they get to stay in business.
The oil and gas companies, especially the vertically integrated tranche, could become producers and retailers of low carbon gas, and take part in a programme for decentralised and efficient energy provision, and maintain their valued contribution to society. At the moment, however, they’re still stuck in the 20th Century.
I’m a positive person, so I’m not going to dwell too much on how stuck-in-the-fossilised-mud the governments and petroindustry are. What I’m aiming to do is start the conversation on how the development of Renewable Gas could displace dirty fossil fuels, and eventually replace the cleaner-but-still-fossil Natural Gas as well.Academic Freedom, Advertise Freely, Alchemical, Assets not Liabilities, Be Prepared, Behaviour Changeling, Big Number, Biofools, British Biogas, Burning Money, Carbon Capture, Carbon Commodities, Carbon Pricing, Carbon Taxatious, Change Management, Climate Change, Conflict of Interest, Corporate Pressure, Cost Effective, Dead End, Delay and Deny, Divest and Survive, Divide & Rule, Dreamworld Economics, Drive Train, Economic Implosion, Efficiency is King, Emissions Impossible, Energy Calculation, Energy Change, Energy Crunch, Energy Denial, Energy Insecurity, Energy Revival, Engineering Marvel, Evil Opposition, Extreme Energy, Financiers of the Apocalypse, Fossilised Fuels, Freemarketeering, Gamechanger, Geogingerneering, Global Warming, Green Gas, Green Power, Hydrocarbon Hegemony, Hydrogen Economy, Insulation, Low Carbon Life, Mad Mad World, Major Shift, Mass Propaganda, Methane Management, Money Sings, National Energy, National Power, Natural Gas, Nuclear Shambles, Oil Change, Optimistic Generation, Orwells, Paradigm Shapeshifter, Peak Coal, Peak Emissions, Policy Warfare, Political Nightmare, Price Control, Public Relations, Realistic Models, Regulatory Ultimatum, Renewable Gas, Renewable Resource, Revolving Door, Shale Game, Solution City, Stirring Stuff, The Data, The Power of Intention, The Right Chemistry, The Science of Communitagion, The War on Error, Unnatural Gas, Unutterably Useless, Utter Futility, Vain Hope, Voluntary Behaviour Change, Vote Loser, Western Hedge
Posted on November 23rd, 2014 2 comments
In an interesting article by two Google engineers, Ross Koningstein and David Fork, "What It Would Really Take to Reverse Climate Change : Today’s renewable energy technologies won’t save us. So what will?", the authors concluded from their modelling scenarios that :-
"While a large emissions cut sure sounded good, this scenario still showed substantial use of natural gas in the electricity sector. That’s because today’s renewable energy sources are limited by suitable geography and their own intermittent power production."
Erm. Yes. Renewable electricity is variable and sometimes not available, because, well, the wind doesn’t always blow and the sun doesn’t always shine, you know. This has been known for quite some time, actually. It’s not exactly news. Natural Gas is an excellent complement to renewable electricity, and that’s why major industrialised country grid networks rely on the pairing of gas and power, and will do so for some time to come. Thus far, no stunner.
What is astonishing is that these brain-the-size-of-a-planet guys do not appear to have asked the awkwardly obvious question of : "so, can we decarbonise the gas supply, then ?" Because the answer is "yes, very largely, yes."
And if you have Renewable Gas backing up Renewable Power, all of a sudden, shazam !, kabam ! and kapoom !, you have An Answer. You can use excess wind power and excess solar power to make gas, and you can store the gas to use when there’s a still, cold period on a wintry night. And at other times of low renewable power, too. And besides using spare green power to make green gas, you can make Renewable Gas in other ways, too.
The Google engineers write :-
"Now, [Research and Development] dollars must go to inventors who are tackling the daunting energy challenge so they can boldly try out their crazy ideas. We can’t yet imagine which of these technologies will ultimately work and usher in a new era of prosperity – but the people of this prosperous future won’t be able to imagine how we lived without them."
Actually, Renewable Gas is completely non-crazy. It’s already being done all over the world in a variety of locations – with a variety of raw resources. We just need to replace the fossil fuel resources with biomass – that’s all.
And there’s more – practically all the technology is over a century old – it just needs refining.
I wonder why the Google boys seem to have been so unaware of this. Maybe they didn’t study the thermodynamics of gas-to-gas reactions at kindergarten, or something.
Thanks to the deliberate misinterpretation of the Google "brothers" article, The Register, James Delingpole’s Breitbart News and Joanne Nova are not exactly helping move the Technological Debate forward, but that’s par for the course. They rubbished climate change science. Now they’ve been shown to be wrong, they’ve moved on, it seems, to rubbishing renewable energy systems. And they’re wrong there, too.
Onwards, my green engineering friends, and upwards.Academic Freedom, Alchemical, Assets not Liabilities, Bait & Switch, British Biogas, Change Management, Climate Change, Delay and Deny, Direction of Travel, Energy Change, Energy Revival, Fossilised Fuels, Gas Storage, Green Gas, Green Investment, Green Power, Hydrocarbon Hegemony, Hydrogen Economy, Low Carbon Life, Media, Modern Myths, Natural Gas, Orwells, Protest & Survive, Pure Hollywood, Realistic Models, Renewable Gas, Renewable Resource, Solar Sunrise, Solution City, Stirring Stuff, Sustainable Deferment, Technofix, The Myth of Innovation, The Power of Intention, The Right Chemistry, The War on Error, Wind of Fortune, Zero Net
Posted on November 14th, 2014 No comments
This week, I had the opportunity to join the launch of the UKERC’s latest research into the future of gas. The esteemed delegates included members of a Russian Trade Delegation and several people from the US Embassy. Clearly, the future of gas is an international thing.
[continued from Gas by Design ]
Mike Bradshaw, Warwick Business School = [MB]
[MB] I’m somewhat daunted by this audience – the report is aimed perhaps for informed public audience. The media [ambushed us on the question of shale gas, shale gas attracted more attention] but things we didn’t cover much about there we can cover here. It’s been a real rollercoaster ride in the gas industry. Any flights of fancy (in the report) are our faults and not theirs [reference to work of colleagues, such as Jonathan Stern at Oxford Institute for Energy Studies]. A set of shortcomings dealing with the issue of Energy Security. There is a tendency to think that oil and gas are the same. They’re not. The framework, the actors and the networks, trade statistics, policies [much different for gas than for oil]. [In the UK for example we are seeing] a rapid increase in import dependence [and in other countries]. Need to [pay] particular understanding on what will happen in far-flung places. Today, the US-China agreement could influence gas demand. [In the literature on gas, some anomalies, perhaps]. Academics may not understand markets. [What we are seeing here is] the globalisation of UK gas security – primarily Europeanisation. There is growing uncertainty [about] the material flow of gas. [Threshold] balance in three sectors – strong seasonality, impact of climate and temperature [on gas demand]. The Russian agreement with Ukraine [and Europe] – the one thing everybody was hoping for was a warm winter. While the gas market is important [industrial use and energy use], domestic/residential demand is still very significant [proportion of total demand], so we need to look at energy efficiency [building insulation rates] and ask will people rip out their gas boilers ? For the UK, we are some way across the gas bridge – gas has enabled us to meet [most of] our Kyoto Protocol commitments. Not long until we’ve crossed it. Our coal – gone. With coal gone, what fills the gaps ? Renewable electricity – but there is much intermittency already. We’re not saying that import dependency is necessarily a problem. Physical security is not really the problem – but the [dependence on] the interconnectors, the LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) imports – these create uncertainties. The UK also plays a role as a gas exporter – and in landing Norwegian gas [bringing it into the European market]. I’m a geographer – have to have at least one map – of gas flows [in and out of the country]. The NTS (National Transmission System – the high pressure Natural Gas-carrying pipeline network – the “backbone” of the gas transmission and distribution system of National Grid] has responded to change – for example in the increasing sources of LNG [and “backflow” and “crossflow” requirements]. There are 9 points of entry for gas into the UK at the moment. If the Bowland Shale is exploited, there could be 100s of new points of entry [the injection of biogas as biomethane into the gas grid would also create new entry points]. A new challenge to the system. [The gas network has had some time to react in the past, for example] LNG imports – the decision to ramp up the capacity was taken a long time ago. [Evolution of] prices in Asia have tracked the gas away [from the European markets] after the Fukushima Dai-ichi disaster. And recently, we have decided to “fill up the tanks” again [LNG imports have risen in the last 24 or so months]. Very little LNG is “firm” – it needs to follow the market. It’s not good to simply say that “the LNG will come” [without modelling this market]. The literature over-emphasises the physical security of the upstream supplies of gas. [The projections have] unconventional gas growing [and growing amounts of biogas]. But it’s far too early to know about shale gas – far too early to make promises about money when we don’t even have a market [yet]. Policy cannot influence the upstream especially in a privatised market. The interconnectors into the European Union means we have to pay much more attention to the Third EU Energy Package. Colleagues in Oxford are tracking that. The thorny question of storage. We have less than 5 bcm (billion cubic metres). We’d like 10% perhaps [of the winter period demand ?] Who should pay for it ? [A very large proportion of our storage is in one place] the Rough. We know what happens – we had a fire at the Rough in 2006… Everyone worries about geopolitics, but there are other potential sources of problems – our ageing infrastructure […] if there is a technical problem and high demand [at the same time]. Resilience [of our gas system is demonstrated by the fact that we have] gas-on-gas competition [in the markets] – “liquid” gas hub trading – setting the NBP (National Balancing Point). [There are actually 3 kinds of gas security to consider] (a) Security of Supply – not really a problem; (b) Security of Transport (Transit) – this depends on markets and (c) Security of Demand – [which strongly depends on whether there is a] different role for gas in the future. But we need to design enough capacity even though we may not use all of it [or not all of the time]. We have mothballed gas-fired power plants already, for reasons you all know about. We already see the failure of the ETS (European Union Emissions Trading Scheme) [but if this can be reformed, as as the Industrial Emissions Directive bites] there will be a return to gas as coal closes. The role of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) becomes critical in retaining gas. CCS however doesn’t answer issues of [physical energy security, since CCS requires higher levels of fuel use].
[Question from the floor] Gas has a role to play in transition. But how do we need to manage that role ? Too much focus on building Renewable Energy system. What is the impact on the current infrastructure ? For managing that decline in the incumbent system – gas is there to help – gas by design rather than gas by default.
[Question from the floor, Jonathan Stern] [In your graphs/diagrams] the Middle East is a major contributor to gas trade. We see it differently. The Qataris [could/may/will] hold back [with expanding production] until 2030. Iran – our study [sees it as] a substitute contributor. Oil-indexed gas under threat and under challenge. If you could focus more on the global gas price… [New resources of gas could be very dispersed.]Very difficult to get UK people to understand [these] impacts on the gas prices [will] come from different places than they can think of.
[Question from the floor] Availability of CCS capacity ? When ? How much ? Assumptions of cost ?
[Question from the floor : Tony Bosworth, Friends of the Earth] Gas as a bridge – how much gas do we need for [this process] ? What about unburnable carbon ? Do we need more gas to meet demands ?
[Answer – to Jonathan Stern – from Christophe McGlade ?] The model doesn’t represent particularly well political probabilities. Iran has a lot of gas – some can come online. It will bring it online if it wants to export it. Some simplifications… might be over optimistic. Your work is helpful to clarify.
On gas prices – indexation versus global gas price – all the later scenarios assumed a globalised gas price. More reasonable assumptions.
On CCS : first [coming onstream] 2025 – initially quite a low level, then increasing by 10% a year. The capital costs are approximately 60% greater than other options and causes a drop in around 10% on efficiency [because making CCS work costs you in extra fuel consumed]. If the prices of energy [including gas] increase, then CCS will have a lesser relative value [?].
On availability of gas : under the 2 degrees Celsius scenario, we could consume 5 tcm (trillion cubic metres) of gas – and this can come from reserves and resources. There are a lot of resources of Natural Gas, but some of it will be at a higher price. In the model we assume development of some new resources, with a growth in shale gas, and other unconventional gas. Because of the climate deal, we need to leave some gas underground.
[Answer from the panel] Indexation of gas prices to oil… Further gas demand is in Asia – it’s a question of whose gas gets burnt. [Something like] 70% of all Natural Gas gets burned indigenously [within the country in which it is produced]. When we talk about “unburnable gas”, we get the response “you’re dreaming” from some oil companies, “it won’t be our fossil fuels that get stranded”. LNG models envisage a different demand profile [in the future, compared to now]. When China [really gets] concerned about air quality [for example]. Different implications.
[Question from the floor, from Centrica ?] What’s in the model for the globalised gas price – Henry Hub plus a bit ? There is not a standard one price.
[Question from the floor] On the question of bridging – the long-term bridge. What issues do you see when you get to 2030 for investment ? [We can see] only for the next few years. What will investors think about that ?
[Question from the floor] [With reference to the Sankey diagram of gas use in the UK] How would that change in a scenario of [electrification – heat and transport being converted to run on electrical power] ?
[Question from the floor] Stranded assets. How the markets might react ? Can you put any numbers on it – especially in the non-CCS scenario ? When do we need to decide [major strategy] for example, [whether we could or should be] shutting off the gas grid ? How would we fund that ? Where are the pinch points ?
[Answer from the panel] On the global gas price – the model does not assume a single price – [it will differ over each] region. [The price is allowed to change regionally [but is assumed to arise from global gas trading without reference to oil prices.] Asian basin will always be more expensive. There will be a temperature differential between different hubs [since consumption is strongly correlated with seasonal change]. On stranded assets – I think you mean gas power plants ? The model is socially-optimal – all regions working towards the 2 degrees Celsius global warming target. The model doesn’t limit stranded assets – and do get in the non-CCS scenario. Build gas plants to 2025 – then used at very low load factors. Coal plants need to reduce [to zero] given that the 2 degrees Celsius targets are demanding. Will need gas for grid balancing – [new gas-fired power generation assets will be] built and not used at high load factors.
[Answer from the panel] Our report – we have assume a whole system question for transition. How successful will the Capacity Mechanism be ? UKERC looking at electrification of heating – but they have not considered the impact on gas (gas-to-power). Will the incentives in place be effective ? The Carbon Budget – what are the implications ? Need to use whole system analysis to understand the impact on gas. Issue of stranded assets : increasingly important now [not at some point in the future]. On pinch point : do we need to wait another three years [for more research] ? Researchers have looked more at what to spend – what to build – and less on how to manage the transition. UKERC have started to explore heat options. It’s a live issue. Referenced in the report.
[Question from the floor, from Richard Sverrisson, News Editor of Montel] Will reform to the EU ETS – the Market Stability Reserve (MSR) – will that be enough to bring gas plant into service ?
[Question from the floor] On oil indexation and the recent crash in the crude price – what if it keeps continuing [downwards] ? It takes gas prices down to be competitive with hub prices. [What about the impact on the economic profitability of] shale oil – where gas driving related prices ? Are there some pricing [functions/variables] in the modelling – or is it merely a physical construct ?
[Question from the floor, from Rob Gross of UCL] On intermittency and the flexibility of low carbon capacity. The geographical units in the modelling are large – the role of gas depends on how the model is constrained vis-a-vis intermittency.
[Answer from the panel, from Christophe McGlade] On carbon dioxide pricing : in the 2 degrees Celsius scenario, the price is assumed to be $200 per tonne. In the non-CCS scenario, the price is in the region of $400 – $500 per tonne [?] From 2020 : carbon price rises steeply – higher than the Carbon Floor Price. How is the the 2 degrees Celsius target introduced ? If you place a temperature constraint on the energy system, the model converts that into carbon emissions. The latest IPCC report shows that there remains an almost linear trend between carbon budget and temperature rise – or should I say a greenhouse gas budget instead : carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O). The emissions pledges of the [European Union ?] have been adopted by this model – also the development of renewable energy and fuel standards. No exogenous assumptions on carbon pricing. On intermittency – the seasonality is represented by summer, winter and intermediate; and time day generalised as morning, night, evening and peak (morning peak). [Tighter modelling would provide more] certainty which would remove ~40% of effective demand [?] Each technology has a contribution to make to peak load. Although, we assume nothing from wind power – cannot capture hour to hour market. The model does build capacity that then it doesn’t use.
[Answer from the panel] On carbon pricing and the EU ETS reform : I wouldn’t hold my breath [that this will happen, or that it will have a major impact]. We have a new commission and their priority is Poland – nothing serious will happen on carbon pricing until 2020. Their emphasis is much more on Central European issues. I don’t expect [us] to have a strong carbon price since policy [will probably be] more focussed on social democracy issues. Moving to a relatively lower price on oil : Asia will hedge. Other explorters currently sticking to indexation with oil. The low price of wet gas (condensate) in the USA is a result of the over-supply, which followed an over-supply in NGLs (Natural Gas Liquids) – a bumpy road. Implications from USA experience ? Again, comes back to watching what is happening in Asia.
[to be continued…]Academic Freedom, Big Picture, Big Society, Carbon Capture, Carbon Pricing, Climate Change, Coal Hell, Emissions Impossible, Freemarketeering, Gamechanger, Global Warming, Green Gas, Hydrocarbon Hegemony, Natural Gas, Oil Change, Paradigm Shapeshifter, Peak Coal, Peak Emissions, Peak Energy, Peak Natural Gas, Peak Oil, Price Control, Realistic Models, Regulatory Ultimatum, Renewable Gas, Renewable Resource, Resource Wards, Shale Game, The Price of Gas, The Price of Oil, Unnatural Gas, Western Hedge, Wind of Fortune
Posted on November 12th, 2014 No comments
Today I attended a meeting of minds.
It’s clear to me that the near-term and mid-term future for energy in the United Kingdom and the European Union will best be centred on Natural Gas and Renewable Electricity, and now the UK Energy Research Centre has modelled essentially the same scenario. This can become a common narrative amongst all parties – the policy people, the economists, the technologists, the non-governmental groups, as long as some key long-term de-carbonisation and energy security objectives are built into the plan.
The researchers wanted to emphasise from their report that the use of Natural Gas should not be a default option in the case that other strategies fail – they want to see a planned transition to a de-carbonised energy system using Natural Gas by design, as a bridge in that transition. Most of the people in the room found they could largely agree with this. Me, too. My only caveat was that when the researchers spoke about Gas-CCS – Natural Gas-fired power generation with Carbon Capture and Storage attached, my choice would be Gas-CCU – Natural Gas-fired power generation with Carbon Capture and Re-utilisation – carbon recycling – which will eventually lead to much lower emissions gas supply at source.
What follows is a transcription of my poorly-written notes at the meeting, so you cannot accept them as verbatim.
Jim Watson, UKERC = [JW]
Christophe McGlade, University College London (UCL) = [CM]
Mike Bradshaw, Warwick Business School = [MB]
[JW] Thanks to Matt Aylott. Live Tweeting #FutureOfGas. Clearly gas is very very important. It’s never out of the news. The media all want to talk about fracking… If we want to meet the 2 degrees Celsius target of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, how much can gas be a part of this ? Is Natural Gas a bridge – how long a ride will that gas bridge be ?
[CM] Gas as a bridge ? There is healthy debate about the Natural Gas contribution to climate change [via the carbon dioxide emissions from burning Natural Gas, and also about how much less in emissions there is from burning Natural Gas compared to burning coal]. The IPCC said that “fuel switching” from coal to gas would offer emissions benefits, but some research, notably McJeon et al. (2014) made statements that switching to Natural Gas cannot confer emissions benefits. Until recently, there have not been many disaggregated assessments on gas as a bridge. We have used TIAM-UCL. The world is divided into 16 regions. The “climate module” seeks to constrain the global temperature rise to 2 degrees Celsius. One of the outcomes from our model was that export volumes [from all countries] would be severaly impacted by maintaining the price indexation between oil and gas. [Reading from chart on the screen : exports would peak in 2040s]. Another outcome was that gas consumption is not radically affected by different gas market structures. However, the over indexation to the oil price may destroy gas export markets. Total exports of natural gas are higher under the 2 degrees Celsius scenario compared to the 4 degrees Celsius scenario – particularly LNG [Liquefied Natural Gas]. A global climate deal will support gas exports. There will be a higher gas consumption under a 2 degrees Celsius deal compared to unconstrained scenario [leading to a 4 degrees Celsius global temperature rise]. The results of our modelling indicate that gas acts as a bridge fuel out to 2035 [?] in both absolute and relative terms. There is 15% greater gas consumption in the 2 degrees Celsius global warming scenario than in the 4 degrees Celsius global warming scenario. Part of the reason is that under the 4 degrees Celsius scenario, Compressed Natural Gas vehicles are popular, but a lot less useful under the 2 degrees Celsius scenario [where hydrogen and other fuels are brought into play].
There are multiple caveats on these outcomes. The bridging period is strictly time-limited. Some sectors need to sharply reduce consumption [such as building heating by Natural Gas boilers, which can be achieved by mass insulation projects]. Coal must be curtailed, but coal-for-gas substitution alone is not sufficient. Need a convincing narrative about how coal can be curtailed. In an absence of a global binding climate deal we will get consumption increases in both coal and gas. In the model, gas is offsetting 15% of coal by 2020, and 85% by 2030. With Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS), gas’s role is drastically reduced – after 2025 dropping by 2% a year [of permitted gas use]. Not all regions of the world can use gas as a bridge. [Reading from the chart : with CCS, gas is a strong bridging fuel in the China, EU, India, Japan and South Korea regions, but without CCS, gas is only strong in China. With CCS, gas’s bridging role is good in Australasia, ODA presumably “Offical Development Assistance” countries and USA. Without CCS, gas is good for Africa, Australasia, EU, India, Japan, South Korea, ODA and USA.]
In the UK, despite the current reliance on coal, there is little scope to use it as a transition fuel. Gas is unlikely to be removed from UK energy system by 2050.
[Question from the floor] The logic of gas price indexation with the oil price ?
[CM] If maintain oil indexation, exports will reduce as countries turn more towards indigenous at-home production of gas for their domestic demand. This would not be completely counter-balanced by higher oil and therefore gas prices, which should stimulate more exports.
[Point from the floor] This assumes logical behaviour…
[Question from the floor] [Question about Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS)]
[CM] The model does anticipate more CCS – which permits some extra coal consumption [at the end of the modelling period]. Gas-CCS [gas-fired power generation with CCS attached] is always going to generate less emissions than coal-CCS [coal-fired power generation with CCS attached] – so the model prefers gas-CCS.
[to be continued…]Academic Freedom, Advancing Africa, Assets not Liabilities, Big Picture, Change Management, China Syndrome, Climate Change, Coal Hell, Deal Breakers, Design Matters, Direction of Travel, Emissions Impossible, Energy Change, Energy Revival, Fossilised Fuels, Green Gas, Hydrocarbon Hegemony, Marvellous Wonderful, Methane Management, Natural Gas, Nudge & Budge, Optimistic Generation, Paradigm Shapeshifter, Peak Coal, Peak Emissions, Peak Energy, Peak Natural Gas, Price Control, Realistic Models, Regulatory Ultimatum, Renewable Gas, Science Rules, Shale Game, Solution City, The Data, The Power of Intention, The Price of Gas, The Price of Oil, The Right Chemistry, The War on Error, Unconventional Foul, Unnatural Gas
Posted on November 9th, 2014 No comments
So I was in a meeting on a dateless date, at an organisation with a nameless name, with some other unidentifiable people in the room with me. For some reason I had been invited, I cannot think why. Ah, yes, I can. I was invited to attend because, apparently, I am a “campaigner”. I am, allegedly, somebody who buys into the notion that communications should serve the purpose of directing public attention and support towards a particular outcome, decided in advance by a political elite. And it seems, if I believe something is right, and that a message needs communicating, I will take action, but never invoice, because I am a believer. Well let me tell you right here and now, I am not that person. I may have that reputation, but really, I despise propaganda : the deliberate formation of a murmur of Tweet starlings, or the collective wall-to-wall newspaper coverage of the same story, the scandal story hauled out to scare the horses and herd them to the salt water shore, the faux narrative of collective political or social will for change.
I want to believe that even though I am occasionally paid to communicate a story (but most often not), that my narrative, and importantly my agenda, is my own. I will not be co-opted. I shall not be defined by storytelling, I shall not be paid for spreading information – for if I were to be telling money-backed tales, I may end up peddling lies. And I do not want lies to be spoken. I am an ontologist. My ontology is :-
There is no “therefore” in what I write. When I say “should”, like, “we should adopt renewable energy”, it’s your choice as to whether you agree with me. You shouldn’t read anything and be swayed or directed, except by the force of reason based on evidence. I am the photographer, the recorder, but not the public relations consultant. And I am especially not an unsalaried volunteer. I paint the future using my own perspective, my own understanding, my own research, my own best judgement, but I am not telling people what to think. Although I go slightly beyond merely noting and analysing what is happening, to articulate possible futures, I am not a persuader.
I do not want to write the script for the actions of the readers or listeners. I do not want to precipitate a revolution, or dehydrate the horses before leading them to the river bank. I want to describe rather than proscribe or prescribe. I want to scribe the way I see things, I do not do it in order to create waves or push buttons or light beacons. The facts should speak for themselves, and if anybody consumes my communication, they should be free to act as they feel fit, or suits. I am not a paid-for, paid-up, in-the-pocket campaigner. I am not spun round other peoples’ fingers like a talking puppet. I am a free person.
So, there I was in this meeting, and the people in the room were discussing an event that is likely to take place. It appears from some analysis that the next British Government could well be another Coalition Government, with the Conservative Party having only a shaving of a majority for rule. And when they have crossed the i’s and dotted the t’s and formed a currently impossible political marriage, which I’m guessing will involve the Green Party as well as the Liberal Democrats, then they will need to live up to their promise to hold a referendum on British participation in the Grand European Experiment – economic union with other European countries.
But nobody talks about Europe. Except to complain. In the meeting I attended, the hosts of the meeting were consulting for ways to highlight the Europe Question, and to give it a pro-Union light.
For me, it’s facile. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is just a bunch of mediocre-sized islands off the coast of the European continent. Something like 80% of UK trade is with European countries, because Europe is our gateway to the rest of the global market, and you always do the most trade with your neighbours. It’s natural. Can anybody seriously suggest we ditch the Common Market – the agreements that European countries have come to to ensure common standards of goods and services, common terms and conditions of trade and common legal processes regulating trade ? So we want to reserve some kind of sovereignty over some kinds of decisions ? Why ? The UK is heavily involved in the central European institutions and governance bodies. We have massive input. We vote for MEPs. Why should things not go our way ? And even if things don’t go perfectly our way, will the negotiated compromises be so bad ? Subsidiarity – making decisions at the lowest/best/most appropriate level of administration – that’s still going to keep a lot of British control over British affairs. Surely the UK suffers a greater risk of interference from any pan-Atlantic trade deal that it does from Europe ?
The UK have made commitments. Our Parliament has agreed that we need to work on climate change, social justice and economic stability. We have implicitly agreed that to address climate change we need Energy Change and environmental regulation; to achieve social justice we need human rights, justice, health, education and a benefits system; and for economic stability we need economic stimuli – for example, in national infrastructure projects. In terms of climate change and Energy Change there is so much we need to do. If we stay in Europe, all of this will be so much easier. Within the European project for energy market harmonisation is the work on standards to achieve gas and electricity grid harmonisation. The improvement and augmenting of interconnections between countries, and the provision of wider energy storage, will enable the balanced use of renewable energy. Governments need to create incentives for deploying renewable energy. Governments need to create mechanisms to leverage and facilitate renewable energy deployment. Without Europe, outwith Europe, it will cost us more, and be more complex. Within Europe, it will be easier.
So, in the meeting I attended, I put forward my vision : if the UK stays in Europe, it will be easier to handle problems of energy – improving and replacing infrastructure and plant, co-ordinating the uptake of new renewable energy technologies and dealing with emerging energy security issues. Why, the North Sea, as everybody knows, is draining dry, and we can only build certain levels of relationship with countries outside the European Union, such as Russia. If the UK left the EU, the EU would be competitors with the UK for Russian Natural Gas, for example. I said I thought that energy security was a good thing to explain to people and a good reason to raise support for UK’s continued participation in Europe.
So, somebody else in the meeting, who shall remain faceless and nameless, poured very cold water on this idea. They seemed to disbelieve that the UK faces risks to energy security. Instead, they suggested that the pro-Europe argument should be based on how the UK can “keep our place at the table”. How out of touch can one get, I thought to myself ? This kind of patrician argument is not going to wash. Appealing to some non-existent pride in the UK’s continued role as stakeholder in the European project is going to go down like a lead balloon. It’s a vote loser, for sure.
What most people care about first is money. Their money. Any appeal to their pockets is going to help. We live in tough times – thanks to Government austerity policy – and we still cannot get a handle on public borrowing and spending. Because of the Government’s austerity policy.
So how about we cast it like this : your energy is going to get much more expensive if the UK abandons the European community of nations. Plus, your lights could genuinely go out, unless you, the people, either as taxpayers or billpayers, fork out for new energy investments that the energy companies haven’t made for 20 years. Because of privatisation. Without taking part in the European energy market harmonisation, and the European development of new and renewable energy infrastructure, plant and networks, your bills could significantly rise/spiral out of control. If European companies were required to sell energy assets back to the UK, because the UK pulled out of Europe, we would be in a very fine mess indeed. Do you really want this kind of chaos ? Energy policy in the UK is already bad enough.
The facts are available to those who search : British production of oil and gas from the North Sea is declining at something like 6% a year. The UK became a net energy importer between 2004 and 2006 (depending on how you define it). The Netherlands will become a net Natural Gas importer in the 2020s. Norway’s Natural Gas will reach a peak some time in the 2020s. It’s no good thinking that because the UK is a “gas hub”, and that British finance can currently spin up gas imports to the UK, that this situation is going to remain true. Within 10 to 15 years, I think that the UK will face significant competition for Natural Gas supplies with other European countries. Better to be in the debating chamber, surely, rather than scratching at the wind-and-rain-splattered window from outside ? So can the UK forge a gas alliance with countries outside the European Union, and apart from Norway ? A gas import alliance that sticks ? And that isn’t demolished by competition from the rest of the European Union for gas supplies that come through pipes sitting in European Union territory ? OK, the UK might want to leave full European Union membership, and join Norway in the European Economic Area, but will this guarantee beneficial import status for Natural Gas from countries that supply the full members of the European Community ?
I said, instead of trying to talk about direct opposites – either Inside Europe or Outside Europe – let’s talk about how things can be helped by wider co-operation. The European Union was founded on energy treaties – coal and nuclear energy (and steel), and now Europe needs to move to a union forged on renewable power and Natural Gas – and later Renewable Gas – and it’s going to be so much easier to do if the UK stays at the party.
The North Sea needs re-developing. Not for oil, but for wind power. This is going to happen best with full cross-border co-operation. Already, the UK has agreed to play a large part in the “North Sea Offshore Grid” wind power project in league with Ireland, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, The Netherlands, Belgium and France. And Luxembourg, strangely, although it doesn’t have a coast. Unlike new nuclear power, which could be decades in construction, offshore and onshore wind in Europe can be quick-build. If you want new power, you pick wind and solar. And, despite policy fumbles, this is happening. Actually, in the end, who really cares about subsidies for renewable energy, when the most capital-heavy organisations in the world start backing renewable power ? In some ways, I don’t care who brings me low carbon energy, and I don’t care if I have to pay for it through my tax or my bills, I just want it to happen. OK, offshore wind power is for the big boys, and you’re never going to get a diversity of suppliers with this project, and the dreams of decentralised energy are vapours, whisked away by giant engineering firms, but at least renewable energy is going to happen. One day people will realise that for the newspapers to rehearse the arguments of High Net Worth Individuals, and for sheep-like energy ministers to complain about onshore wind power and solar farms, is just a way to keep small electricity generators out of the energy markets, and allow the incumbent energy players to keep making profits. But when the need for a multiplicity of small energy installations becomes critical, I think this tune will change.
I can see all this. But, because I am not a spin meister, or spin meistress, or a campaigner, I’m not going to be crafting fine messages to share with my networks on this particular subject. I did start (see below), but then I thought better of it. I dislike the use of social media, web logging and journalism to push an agenda. The trouble is, I know that the people who are vehemently against the European endeavour have so many trigger arguments tested and ready to deploy, such as : immigration, regulations, budgetary demands. None of these stand up to scutiny, but they are very easy props on which to deploy Corpse Factory scares and scandals, up there with the War on Terror. The pro-European segment of the population always stays so silent. If there were to be a Referendum on Europe today, I can pretty much guarantee a kneejerk exit. The British public act collectively by reflex. They never re-analyse their position. They mob, gang and plunder.
I don’t think pro-Europe organisations know how to sell Europe. But they shouldn’t need to “sell” Europe. European membership should be an obvious best choice. So why should I try to talk up Europe ? I couldn’t have any influence, as one lone voice, against the Daily Mails, Daily Expresses and Daily Telegraphs of this world. And anyway, it’s not really my fight to fight. I don’t have a job title that reads “arch propagandist”. I am not that person. It does not become me. I prefer straight-talking, not mind-bending.
I won’t get invited back. That’s just fine. I am not a volunteer campaigner. I’m not a political pusher. I’ve only played the role of “evangelist” on climate change, renewable energy and good policy because sometimes there is little else I can think of that might help or make a difference. But I don’t have any influence. And I don’t want any. I am just going to continue telling it the way I see it. Giving my perspective. I cannot guarantee any outcomes. And anyway, I prefer democratic engagement over salesmanship. Don’t ask me to sell your ideas, your policies, your projections. I don’t want to.
Full membership of the European Union is the logical option for the United Kingdom, no matter how many tired dead donkey corpses the rabid tabloid media keep digging up to appall us all. Sooner or later, we also need to consider joining the Euro currency, and I predict we will, but I’m not your convincer on that argument, either.
“What has Europe ever done for us ?”
Common Climate : Common Cause : Common Market
On climate change, the United Kingdom has secured the Climate Change Act, legislation with broad-based support across all political parties. The UK shares the concerns of other European countries about the potential risks and impacts from climate change in our geographical region. Society-level change in response to climate change includes energy change – changing the sources and use of energy – and changing policies for land use to include planting forests and energy crops. Within the European Community, the UK has worked to secure region-wide legislation on renewable energy, energy efficiency, waste control and air quality. All of these contribute to the response to climate change, and have developed action on climate change into a common cause. In addition to regulatory change, the European Community is seeking to develop trading mechanisms to enable carbon dioxide emissions control, and it working to develop a common market in carbon.
Common Future : Common Purpose : Common Interest
Common Values : Common Opportunities : Common Voice
Common Security : Common Goals : Common Networks
Common Infrastructure : Common Society : Common Protection
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Posted on November 2nd, 2014 No comments
I’m all for peak shaving, so we tried a low power kettle at home, but it rusted. So we tried another one, and the lid broke. Seriously, the low wattage appliance manufacturers need to get their act together. No, we don’t just want low energy appliances because we spend our holidays in a motor home powering everything off a cigarette lighter in a car, or a 12 volt car battery. Our kettle is not for occasional use. It needs to last.
So, we plugged in the spare kettle – the one that had been sitting on top of the kitchen cupboard attracting spiders and flying fat in the form of aerosols from frying pans. Ergh. Sticky. Yuck. So we cleaned it. Then it caused a power surge and blew the fuses and melted a plug socket. Yikes. Time to buy a new kettle. Again. And time to call an NICEIC registered tradesperson. Man of the moment, Carl, turned up ready for a chat.
We discussed some of the finer points of electrical conductivity and sparks and arcing, and why I prefer to turn the toaster off at night. Because of the dangers of carbonised breadcrumbs. Carl replaces the double wall socket, and then he asks me what I’m doing at the moment, since he recalls chatting with me last year on a service call.
I say I’m writing a book about Renewable Gas, and then I leave silence in the air for a few seconds for his brain to fire off some neurons and make a few connections. He asks whether I mean biogas. I say, yes, partly. We talk about cow burps, and why some humans cannot expel methane, because of the differing flora and fauna in their guts. I say that people can produce appreciable amounts of hydrogen gas from their intestines as well as hydrogen sulfide and other sulfur compounds. We talk about mercaptans, the smelly sulfur chemicals added to Natural Gas to make sure people can detect leaks because both methane and hydrogen are actually colourless and odourless. Both of us appear to be pretty good at detecting gas leaks in the urban landscape – he once reported one at a gasometer – an old-fashioned gas storage device with a lifting centre. We both commented that the mercaptans seem to stick to gas appliances as they always seem to be smelly close up.
I say that although it’s not really practical to capture cow burps unless they’re all in a shed at night, I say that there is a lot of scope for developing biogas from anaerobic digestion of waste, and also gas from sewage treatment. And then I say that Renewable Gas needs to get bigger than just biologically-derived gas – there is scope for manufacturing gas. We used to manufacture gas, from coal, stored in gasometers in a decentralised fashion. I say Renewable Gas is about scaling up industrial gas – such as producing Renewable Hydrogen, recycling carbon dioxide by methanation with Renewable Hydrogen.
I say, look at Germany. Germany has a plan. By around 2025 they aim to have at least 10% of their gas supplies coming from sustainable and renewable resources – 2% hydrogen and 8% renewable methane. And of course, Natural Gas is 75% to 95% methane, so green methane can be directly substituted for fossil methane.
I talk about the basic chemistry comparing combustion to gasification. He asks what gasification is – is it like making liquids into gas ? No, I say, it’s chemistry. In normal combustion, or oxidation, the end products are steam, or water – H2O – and carbon dioxide – CO2. I draw on a piece of paper. In gasification, the oxygen is restricted – partial oxidation – and the end products are hydrogen – H2 – instead of H2O, and carbon monoxide – CO – instead of CO2. These are both useful fuels, although the carbon monoxide is toxic. Plus, after you’ve removed tars, carbon dust and ash, these are clean fuels, unlike the raw resources. You could use biomass as the feedstock and make this a useful way to make larger volumes of green gas.
I said that Renewable Gas is a good complement to Renewable Electricity – because the wind does not always blow and the sun does not always shine. I said that to really promote the use of both, we need to have massive amounts of new renewable power, to provide spare electricity to make Renewable Gas.
We talked about how there could be so much more progress with Renewable Electricity. We talked about Liz Truss dismissing solar farms because she believes they conflict with agricultural production. Carl and I both shrugged. I said sheep may safely graze under solar panels mounted on frames. Or chickens. I asked Carl somewhat rhetorically what the difference was between a solar farm and a field of greenhouses ? He couldn’t know, and he told me about how he’d been to see a fascinating farm where they had solar greenhouses, making power to grow vegetables.
Posted on October 25th, 2014 No comments
How do we get things changed in a democracy ? The model of political campaigning that has been established over the last century is failing us. In the past, if there was a problem, a small group of people could create a fuss about it, march some placards to somewhere relevant, write some letters, talk to some dignitaries, chain themselves to some railings, occupy a lobby, get some press, and after some years, maybe, get something done.
These days there are just too many complaints for them all to be heard. Philanthropic, charitable and political messages crowd the stage. In this age of social media, the campaign metaphor has been replaced by a ladder of concern. Concern is expressed. Hopefully others will find that they too are sufficiently concerned, and reflect that concern through some medium. And slowly, it is hoped, this concern climbs the ladder of attention, until it is visible, audible. The entitled and endowed middle classes catch the concern, and repeat it. Lots of emails fly. George Monbiot writes about it in The Guardian. Some speeches are made at serious meetings. Angelina Jolie is invited to grace a conference. And then, hopefully, this concern hits the people who have some kind of leverage over the problem, and they act.
Action is almost guaranteed if the concern is the result of a specific outrage, committed by a specific person or group, and has a specific solution. But otherwise, who knows ? How universal and impactful does a concern need to be before it gets acted upon ? And surely some things don’t need campaigns, because the governments already know enough about problems such as people trafficking, slavery, animal welfare, crime and torture ? After all, things such as prostitution and illegal drug trade are included in national economic statistics.
I took public transport today in London and I was doused in outrage pouring from advertisements asking for charitable giving to prevent the inhuman practice of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM). As I read these appeals, I felt two overwhelming sensations – one of intense anger that children are being permanently injured because of insane and unjustifiable, hateful beliefs about female sexuality. And a second feeling of dragging despair that giving a small donation every month to this organisation would have very little impact on abusive culture, which leads to many forms of violation, not just the unimaginably painful and destructive incision and even resection of a child’s clitoris and the sewing together of her labia, leading to permanent nerve damage, lasting wounds, loss of sexual function, complications from incontinence, ruined relationships, injuries from sexual intercourse, and serious medical risks during childbirth, and possibly the need for reconstructive surgery.
This is a problem which cannot be fixed by expressing normal murmurs of concern, building a wave of concern that climbs a ladder of concern, or making monthly token charitable payments. This concern is not susceptible to a campaign. What this problem needs is regulation, legislation, policing. This concern shouldn’t have to compete with all the other concerns out there, like distressed retired donkeys, threatened butterflies, meltdown polar bears, de-forested orangutans and by-catch dolphins. Some things just shouldn’t happen. They just shouldn’t be tolerated. And they shouldn’t be lost amongst an avalanche of other concerns. This problem is so serious that it should be an automatic priority for all the authorities, co-ordinating to detect and prevent it. This concern shouldn’t have to campaign for funds. Or attention.
Switch to BBC News. Roger Harrabin reports that “The UK’s chief scientist says the oceans face a serious and growing risk from man-made carbon emissions. […] Sir Mark Walport warns that the acidity of the oceans has increased by about 25% since the industrial revolution, mainly thanks to manmade emissions. […] He told BBC News: “If we carry on emitting CO2 [carbon dioxide] at the same rate, ocean acidification will create substantial risks to complex marine food webs and ecosystems.” […] The consequences of acidification are likely to be made worse by the warming of the ocean expected with climate change, a process which is also driven by CO2.”
Media Lens Editors reported this piece. My reaction was – who would be paying attention to this ? This is not the “dangerous climate change comes from global warming” story, this is the “other” carbon problem, the decimation of marine productivity and the whole pyramid of life, resulting from increasing levels of dissolved carbon dioxide in seawater because of higher levels of carbon dioxide in the air. The overwhelmingly major causes of this problem are irrefutably and definitely fossil fuel combustion, and its seriousness is hard to deny, even though Roger Harrabin attempts to make light of it by devoting column inches to a laboratory crab who isn’t getting with the programme.
Ocean acidification is a concern that shouldn’t get lost in amongst other concerns. It should be paid serious levels of attention. And not just by middle class philanthropists who work for non-governmental organisations and charities. And yet, cursory analysis of the segmentation of the population who treat BBC News as a main and trusted information source may suggest that the only readers who would act on this piece are exactly these middle class charity staff, or at a push, retired middle class charity staff.
My Media Lens comment was, “Right expert. Right message. Wrong audience. Wrong medium. The UK Government’s chief scientist. OK. Good. Ocean acidification. OK. Good. No quibbles about whether or not extra carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is a real problem or not (as known as “climate change” or “global warming”, which is real by the way). The BBC News. Wrong medium. Wrong audience. The only people going to listen to this are those who already know about the problem but are still as powerless to act as they were yesterday. The UK Government should present this information to the oil, gas and coal companies with a polite request for them to unveil their plan of action in the face of this undeniable problem.”
There is no reason why this story should be covered in BBC News by Roger Harrabin. What can anybody reading it do about the problem ? There is no purpose for this article. It is a pointless statement of concern, or rather, a belittling rehearsal of the concern. Unless this article, and the thousands like it, lead to the Government demanding answers on Energy Change from the fossil fuel companies, there is no point in reporting it, or in this case, disparaging it with faint humour.
The only time that ocean acidification should appear in a media piece is to report that the problem has been presented to the architects of increased ocean carbon dioxide, and answers have been requested.
And who are the architects of increased atmospheric and ocean carbon dioxide ? Those who mine fossil fuels. Those companies like BP and Shell, ExxonMobil, and all the coal extraction companies should act. They should offer us alternative non-fossil fuel energy. And the news should be about how these companies are taking action to offer us Renewable Hydrogen, Renewable Methane, solar power, wind power and Zero Carbon transport fuels.
Answers from the past will simply not do. Trying to assert that somebody needs to pay for pollution won’t prevent pollution occurring. Carbon taxes or carbon pricing won’t work – since they won’t prevent the mining of fossil fuels – and if fossil fuels are mined, of course they will be burned. Carbon combustion quotas won’t work – since economic wealth is based on burning carbon, so many forces will conspire to maintain levels of fossil fuel combustion. Carbon mining quotas won’t work, since the forces for increasing mining quotas are strong. Carbon trading won’t work, since it won’t reduce the amount of fossil fuels mined – because, obviously, if fossil fuels are mined, they will be burned.
I am tired of reading about climate change, global warming, freshwater stress and ocean acidification in the news. It seems there is nothing I can do that I have not already done that can provide a solution to these problems. Enough with communicating the disaster. I want to read about engineering and energy companies who have switched business models to producing Zero Carbon energy. I want to hear how energy security concern is taking oil, gas and coal companies towards Renewable Everything.Acid Ocean, Animal Kingdoom, Babykillers, Behaviour Changeling, Big Picture, Big Society, Carbon Capture, Carbon Commodities, Carbon Pricing, Carbon Rationing, Carbon Taxatious, Change Management, Climate Change, Climate Chaos, Climate Damages, Coal Hell, Corporate Pressure, Demoticratica, Disturbing Trends, Divide & Rule, Emissions Impossible, Energy Autonomy, Energy Crunch, Energy Denial, Energy Disenfranchisement, Energy Insecurity, Engineering Marvel, Fossilised Fuels, Freshwater Stress, Gamechanger, Global Heating, Global Singeing, Global Warming, Green Gas, Green Power, Human Nurture, Hydrogen Economy, Landslide, Mad Mad World, Major Shift, Mass Propaganda, Media, Meltdown, Oil Change, Paradigm Shapeshifter, Peak Coal, Peak Emissions, Peak Energy, Peak Natural Gas, Peak Oil, Policy Warfare, Political Nightmare, Public Relations, Pure Hollywood, Regulatory Ultimatum, Renewable Gas, Resource Curse, Screaming Panic, Social Capital, Social Change, Social Chaos, Social Democracy, Solar Sunrise, Solution City, Stirring Stuff, The Science of Communitagion, Vote Loser, Wind of Fortune, Zero Net
Posted on October 22nd, 2014 No comments
So, I’m waiting at the platform for the local commuter train on my way into town. I see Mick, retired electrician, dressed in a Stasi-like black leather jacket.
We start to talk, and climb aboard. I explain I’ve just written a draft of a book on Renewable Gas. I pause a few seconds to let him pin down that idea.
We talk about gas from landfill sites, and how expensive it is to retrofit methane-capturing equipment to already-established tips. I say there’s potential to make gas from the landfill waste itself, not just its methane emissions. We talk about the potential for biogas from sewage sludge at wastewater treatment plants. I say there are new techniques that do anaerobic digestion at an advanced rate. And then I say I’m also looking at a much larger opportunity to manufacture gas by reacting renewable hydrogen with waste industrial carbon dioxide.
He says, we used to manufacture gas. From coal. Yes, town gas. Although it’s dirty. Yes, but you can mitigate environmental impacts. For example, if you have a slagging gasifier all the really toxic elements come out as vitrified glass.
I’ve seen that, he said, when I was doing a job in Scotland. I can’t remember where. It was just like glass, with stripes of different colours running through it.
I said there was a big consortium of British and Americans working on this in research units, including the state enterprise that eventually became British Gas. In the period 1974 onwards there was a research site in Scotland. Making SNG – synthetic natural gas. But the changeover to Natural Gas meant the closure of the research projects in around 1981.
Mick nods. He said over the years he’s been in a lot of gas processing facilities installing emergency power equipment.
Gas and power. Gas-to-power. I don’t quite get on to the story of Power-to-Gas before our seven minutes of train chat is up, and Mick the neo-Stasi and I part company.
[ UPDATE : Yes. We did talk about shale gas. We agreed that production of Natural Gas from the North Sea was declining, and that there are some people incredibly positive that shale gas production can be significant. I suggested it might not be. ]
Posted on June 4th, 2014 1 comment
My previous Freedom of Information Request having been so snubbingly turned down, I have had another crack at it. I don’t mean to be annoying – I am genuinely in search of information, as it appears to me there is a serious gap in published policy on bringing novel supplies of gas energy fuel to market, both for reasons of energy security and climate change. By my reckoning, there must have been a considerable amount of research and reporting going on in this area, so I’m asking for access to it. Simple enough a request, surely ?
To: Information Rights Unit, Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, 5th Floor, Victoria 3, 1 Victoria Street, London SW1H OET
4th June 2014
Request to the Department of Energy and Climate Change
Re : Policy and Strategy for North Sea Natural Gas Fields Depletion
Previous Freedom of Information Request Reference : FOI2014/11187
Previous Freedom of Information Request Dated : 28th May 2014
Former Freedom of Information Request Reference : 14/0672
Former Freedom of Information Request Dated : 27th April 2014
Dear Madam / Sir,
Thank you for your reply to my previous and former Freedom of Information Requests.
I have some specific questions as regards manufactured gas and fermented or anaerobically digested gas of biological origin.
1. Planned Support for New Gas Market Entrants
In respect of the third package of European Community energy legislation :-
“Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC” ( http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:211:0094:0136:en:PDF )
especially considering the Preamble, Paragraphs 26 and 41 :-
“Member States should take concrete measures to assist the wider use of biogas and gas from biomass, the producers of which should be granted non discriminatory access to the gas system, provided that such access is compatible with the relevant technical rules and safety standards on an ongoing basis.”
“Member States should ensure that, taking into account the necessary quality requirements, biogas and gas from biomass or other types of gas are granted non-discriminatory access to the gas system, provided such access is permanently compatible with the relevant technical rules and safety standards. Those rules and standards should ensure that those gases can technically and safely be injected into, and transported through the natural gas system and should also address their chemical characteristics.”
and reviewing Directive, Chapter 1, Article 1, Section 2 :-
“The rules established by this Directive for natural gas, including LNG, shall also apply in a non-discriminatory way to biogas and gas from biomass or other types of gas in so far as such gases can technically and safely be injected into, and transported through, the natural gas system.”
and in light of the requirement for balancing mechanisms to ensure market access for all gas supply players as in the Preamble, Paragraph 31 :-
“In order to ensure effective market access for all market players, including new entrants, non-discriminatory and cost-reflective balancing mechanisms are necessary. This should be achieved through the setting up of transparent market-based mechanisms for the supply and purchase of gas, needed in the framework of balancing requirements. National regulatory authorities should play an active role to ensure that balancing tariffs are non-discriminatory and cost-reflective. At the same time, appropriate incentives should be provided to balance the in-put and off-take of gas and not to endanger the system.”
and in the light of legislation on the harmonisation of the European Union gas markets, and the research into and development of gas quality standards, such as CEN Mandate M/400, and network operator regulations,
Under the Freedom of Information Act of 2000, I am asking for any and all emails, electronic documents, Internet hypertext links to electronic documents, paper files or other material bearing information relating to the subject of UK Government support for the production of supplies of manufactured gas and fermented or anaerobically digested gas of biological origin, in relation to the requirements and articles of EC Directive 2009/73/EC and related documents (see above), produced by the Department of Energy and Climate Change between the dates of 13 July 2009 and today; including any reviews of the National Renewable Energy Action Plan; research, reports and studies commissioned on incentivising supplies of non-geological gas; databases of potential producers; and modelled estimates on the costs of new supplies of gas.
2. The Potential for Synthetic Natural Gas (SNG)
In the reply to my Freedom of Information Request of 27th April 2014, with the reference number 14/0672, the following statement was offered :-
“Furthermore, we have doubts that synthetic natural gas production under current technologies could meet any significant shortfall of gas supply either economically or in sufficient quantity.”
Following the lead of the UK Bioenergy Strategy, originally published on the 25th April 2012, Paragraphs 13 and 14 of the Executive Summary ( https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-bioenergy-strategy ) :-
“A key finding of the modelling and analysis prepared for this strategy is that over the longer term, the most appropriate energy use will vary according to the availability of carbon capture and storage. Assuming carbon capture and storage for biomass-fuelled systems is available, bioenergy use for electricity and transport could be the most appropriate use.”
“The strategy also identifies the development of biosynthetic gas, hydrogen and advanced biofuels as the key bioenergy hedging options against these inherent long term uncertainties. To realise these opportunities, Government needs to continue to support UK technology research, development and demonstration to provide the fullest range of options that will enable the deployment of the low-risk pathways noted above. This innovation support should aim to sustainably increase feedstock energy yields and develop cost effective process and conversion technologies to optimise energy efficiency and minimise carbon emissions.”
and in respect of National Grid’s report on Renewable Gas, “The Potential for Renewable Gas in the UK”, published in January 2009 ( http://www.nationalgrid.com/NR/rdonlyres/9122AEBA-5E50-43CA-81E5-8FD98C2CA4EC/32182/renewablegasWPfinal2.pdf ),
In accordance with the Freedom of Information Act of 2000, please could you send me any and all emails, electronic documents, Internet hypertext links to electronic documents, paper files or other material bearing information relating to the subject of the potential of the current technologies for Synthetic Natural Gas (SNG), that form the basis of your lack of confidence for SNG to meet any significant shortfall of gas supply either economically or in terms of quantity, produced by the Department of Energy and Climate Change between the dates of 1st January 2009 and today; including copies of final reports, reviews and studies in relation to the GridGas project with ITM Power; final reports and reviews of the feasibility study into the Production of Synthetic Methane, conducted by ITM Power, as funded by DECC under the Carbon Capture and Storage Innovation Competition; and any communications undertaken with the Energy Delta Gas Research (EDGaR) organisation.
Thank you for your attention to my request for information.
Ms J. Abbess MSc